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ABSTRACT 
The gravity model is a workhorse for econometric studies of the impact of regional trade 
agreements (RTAs). Despite its initial lack of theoretical basis, the model has been successfully 
derived from various trade theories. The latest theoretical derivation by Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) reveals that prior gravity studies have made the critical error of omitting the 
multilateral resistance variable, which results in biased estimates. Other recent studies have 
highlighted empirical issues with the commonly used procedure of log-linearizing the gravity 
model and estimating the parameters using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006) point out that this method yields inconsistent estimates in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004) show that the concomitant practice of 
dropping observations with zero trade values (because the log-linearized model is not defined for 
such observations) will also give rise to biased results. To deal with these two issues of 
inconsistency and bias, we estimate the gravity model in its multiplicative form. Both cross-
sectional and panel data analysis are performed, employing Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator and Poisson Quasi-Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
respectively. Whilst analyzing the impact of RTAs in the light of the new estimation methods, 
this study will also re-evaluate the impact of the Asean Free Trade Area in the context of other 
major RTAs. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The gravity model is a workhorse for econometric studies of the impact of regional trade 
agreements (RTAs). Despite its initial lack of theoretical basis, the model has been successfully 
derived from various trade theories. The latest theoretical derivation by Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) reveals that prior gravity studies have made the critical error of omitting the 
multilateral resistance variable, which results in biased estimates. Other recent studies have 
highlighted empirical issues with the commonly used procedure of log-linearizing the gravity 
model and estimating the parameters using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006) point out that this method yields inconsistent estimates in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004) show that the concomitant practice of 
dropping observations with zero trade values (because the log-linearized model is not defined for 
such observations) will also give rise to biased results. To deal with these two issues of 
inconsistency and bias, we estimate the gravity model in its multiplicative form. Both cross-
sectional and panel data analysis are performed, employing Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator and Poisson Quasi-Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
respectively. Whilst analyzing the impact of RTAs in the light of the new estimation methods, 
this study will also re-evaluate the impact of the Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA) in the context 
of other major RTAs. 
This chapter gives an overview of the development of RTAs (section 1.1) and a literature 
review of empirical studies (section 1.2). Chapter 2 will give a more detailed discussion of the 
gravity model while Chapter 3 explains the methodological approach. Chapter 4 presents the 
results for selected RTAs. In Chapter 5, we re-evaluate the impact of AFTA in the context of the 
findings and discuss its implications. Chapter 6 concludes. 
 
1.1 Regional Trade Agreements 
1.1.1 Evolution of RTAs 
The number of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) has grown dramatically since the 
1990s, with the number of RTAs increasing seven-fold in the fifteen years spanning 1990 to 
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20051. In fact, Mongolia is the only WTO member left who is not engaged in RTAs of one sort 
or another (Crawford and Florentino (2005)).  
 
Figure 1: Number of RTAs Notified and in Force 
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Source: WTO Secretariat 
 
The “First Regionalism” in the 1960s to 1970s, as termed by Bhagwati (1992), was 
sparked off by the formation of the European community in 1958. This first wave of regionalism 
was in the context of high general tariff levels, with some developing countries attempting to 
reduce costs of import-substituting industrialization by exploiting economies of scales through 
preferential opening of markets with one another. Bhagwati attributed the “Second Regionalism” 
in the 1980s to the shift in stance by the United States, the traditional champion of 
multilateralism, towards regionalism. Starting with the free trade agreement with Israel in 1985, 
the United States abandoned its long-standing opposition to regional arrangements. 
The motivations for entering into RTA have also evolved over time with political and 
security considerations overshadowing economic ones. The more recent RTAs have shifted focus 
from removal of tariff barriers to ‘new age’ issues like e-commerce, services, foreign direct 
investment, government procurement, labor and environmental standards. Given that economic 
considerations increasingly take a second place in RTAs, there are concerns that the proliferation 
of RTAs will do more harm than good. Bhagwati has been a vocal opponent of RTAs, pointing 
                                                 
1 Information on number of RTAs notified to the WTO the following website: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm 
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out that the “spaghetti bowl” phenomenon of crisscrossing trade preferences and the associated 
rules of origin serve to confound rather than facilitate trade flows. 
Although liberalization through RTAs is generally held to be a second-best option, the 
stalling of multilateral trade talks and the shift in policy stance by the US are two factors that 
continue to spur the proliferation of RTAs.  
 
1.1.2 Effect of RTAs on Trade 
Viner (1950) made seminal contributions to the analysis of RTAs, introducing the now 
familiar concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. Despite its simplicity, Panagariya (1999) 
maintains that Viner’s seminal concepts remain central to this day. RTAs are discriminatory by 
nature and involve only partial elimination of tariffs and, as pointed out by Viner, RTAs are not 
necessarily welfare improving. In fact, both countries left out of the RTA and countries within 
the RTA are susceptible to becoming worse off.  
Trade creation takes place when, as a result of the preferential rate established by an 
RTA, domestic production of a product by a less efficient member country is displaced by the 
imports from more efficient member countries. This generates welfare gains for member 
countries as residents of member countries will pay less to purchase the same product, and these 
gains outweigh the loss in producer surplus and tariff revenues which occur as a result of the 
elimination of protection from competition from RTA partners. 
 Trade diversion occurs when as a result of preferences, imports from a low cost non-
member country outside the RTA are displaced by imports from a higher cost member country. 
This not only represents a cost for the exporting country outside the RTA (that will see its 
exports reduced), but it also represents a cost for the importing country in the RTA. Consumers 
pay a lower price than before the preference was introduced, but the government loses tariff 
revenue. This generates a loss for the country as a whole.  
Thus, an RTA can increase trade among members through trade creation (increased trade 
as a result of relative efficiency) or through trade diversion (increased trade as a result of 
preference). Therefore, an increase in intra-RTA trade arising from the establishment of a RTA 
does not necessarily mean that overall welfare of RTA members has increased. The increase in 
intra-RTA trade needs to be analyzed in conjunction with the result on trade diversion. For 
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example, if there is no evidence of trade diversion, a positive and significant coefficient on the 
PTA-dummy can be imputed only to trade creation, hence the RTA is welfare improving. 
However, if there is evidence of trade diversion, overall welfare effects cannot be derived from 
the impact of the RTA on bilateral trade volumes.  
 
1.1.3 Development of RTAs in ASEAN 
ASEAN negotiated a preferential trade agreement within its membership in 1977, but 
serious progress in removal of barriers did not even get under way until 1987. As recently as 
1989, the fraction of goods eligible for regional preferences was only on the order of 3 percent 
(Frankel (1998), pg 267). At the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992, ASEAN 
initiated the ASEAN Free Trade Area, or AFTA, which laid out a comprehensive program of 
regional tariff reduction, to be carried out in phases through the year 2008. This deadline was 
subsequently moved forward to 2003. 
When the AFTA agreement was originally signed, ASEAN had six members (Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). Vietnam joined in 1995, Laos and 
Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. All four countries were required to sign on to the 
AFTA agreement in order to join ASEAN, but were given longer time frames in which to meet 
AFTA's tariff reduction obligations. 
The motivation for AFTA is not so much about integrating among ASEAN members, but 
rather to help ASEAN members co-operate in increasing their international competitiveness and 
integration with the world. In this sense, the “ultimate objective of AFTA is to increase 
ASEAN’s competitive edge as a production base geared for the world market” (AFTA Reader, 
1993, p.1). In fact ASEAN has been adopting a brand of “open regionalism” that keeps 
membership open (as evidenced by the inclusion of newer members Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia 
and Vietnam), and non-discriminatory liberalization, where member countries are not precluded 
from extending preferential tariffs to non-member countries.  
The momentum of RTAs among ASEAN members have picked up as well, with 
Singapore leading the way (See Table 1 for list of RTAs in force with ASEAN member countries 
as at 1 Mar 2007). Singapore has signed an FTA with Jordan, has launched negotiations with the 
Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Qatar, Panama, Peru, and is considering negotiations with Bahrian, 
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Egypt and Sri Lanka. Singapore has ongoing negotiations with Canada, India, Mexico and P4 
(Trilateral FTA comprising Chile, New Zealand and Brunei). Thailand has opened negotiations 
with New Zealand, signed an FTA with Australia, and is considering FTAs with the EFTA States 
and the US. 
The Republic of Korea has been holding joint-study talks with ASEAN on plans for an 
FTA. ASEAN-China FTA came into force on 1 Jul 03. As for Australia and New Zealand, 
negotiations for an FTA between them and ASEAN countries were launched early 2005. India is 
also engaged in FTA negotiations with ASEAN and Thailand, having signed Framework 
Agreement with both, and is negotiating a Comprehensive Economic cooperation Agreement 
(CECA) with Singapore. 
At the broader regional level, ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are 
discussing plans for an East Asian Community as a new framework for regional cooperation. 
 
Table 1:  RTAs with ASEAN Member Countries (as of 1 March 2007) 
    GATT/WTO notification    
Agreement 
Date of 
entry into 
force 
Date 
notified by 
Parties* 
Related 
provisions Type of agreement ASEAN Member Countries 
PTN 11-Feb-73 9-Nov-71 Enabling Clause Preferential arrangement Philippines 
GSTP 19-Apr-89 25-Sep-89 Enabling Clause Preferential arrangement Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
Laos — Thailand 20-Jun-91 26-Nov-91 Enabling Clause Preferential arrangement Laos, Thailand 
New Zealand - Singapore 1-Jan-01 4-Sep-01 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade agreement Singapore 
New Zealand - Singapore 1-Jan-01 4-Sep-01 GATS Art. V Services agreement Singapore 
Japan - Singapore 30-Nov-02 8-Nov-02 GATS Art. V Services agreement Singapore 
Japan - Singapore 30-Nov-02 8-Nov-02 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade agreement Singapore 
EFTA - Singapore 1-Jan-03 14-Jan-03 GATS Art. V Services agreement Singapore 
EFTA - Singapore 1-Jan-03 14-Jan-03 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade agreement Singapore 
ASEAN - China 1-Jul-03 24-Nov-04 Enabling Clause Preferential arrangement ASEAN 
Singapore - Australia 28-Jul-03 25-Sep-03 GATS Art. V Services agreement Singapore 
Singapore - Australia 28-Jul-03 25-Sep-03 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade agreement Singapore 
United States - Singapore 1-Jan-04 17-Dec-03 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade agreement Singapore 
United States - Singapore 1-Jan-04 17-Dec-03 GATS Art. V Services agreement Singapore 
Thailand - Australia 1-Jan-05 27-Dec-04 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade agreement Thailand 
Thailand - Australia 1-Jan-05 27-Dec-04 GATS Art. V Services agreement Thailand 
Thailand - New Zealand 1-Jul-05 1-Dec-05 GATS Art. V Services agreement Thailand 
Thailand - New Zealand 1-Jul-05 1-Dec-05 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade agreement Thailand 
Jordan - Singapore 22-Aug-05 7-Jul-06 GATS Art. V Services agreement Singapore 
Jordan - Singapore 22-Aug-05 7-Jul-06 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade agreement Singapore 
Republic of Korea - Singapore 2-Mar-06 21-Feb-06 GATS Art. V Services agreement Singapore 
Republic of Korea - Singapore 2-Mar-06 21-Feb-06 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade agreement Singapore 
Japan - Malaysia 13-Jul-06 12-Jul-06 GATS Art. V Services agreement Malaysia 
Japan - Malaysia  13-Jul-06 12-Jul-06 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade agreement Malaysia 
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1.2 Literature Review of Empirical Studies 
Many studies have been made on the effect of RTAs. There are a variety of 
methodologies and interpretation of results differs according to specifications of the empirical 
model. We select three studies with contrasting methodologies and give a summary of the results 
in the table below. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Previous Studies 
Study by Methodology Results 
Frankel (1998) - Log-linearized model 
- Pooled OLS Regression 
- Intra-regional and extra-
regional dummies 
AFTA: Net trade creation 
EC: Net trade creation 
NAFTA: No significant trade creation but 
has trade diversion effects 
Soloaga and Winters 
(2001) 
- Log-linearized model 
- Tobit model 
- Intra-regional, regional 
export and regional import 
dummies 
Cross-Sectional Analysis (levels) 
AFTA: Negative intra-regional dummy 
EU: Negative intra-regional dummy 
NAFTA: Positive intra-regional dummy 
Pooled Data 
AFTA: No significant effect on trade flows 
EU: Import and export diversion 
NAFTA: No significant effect on trade flows 
Cheng and Wall 
(2005) 
- Log-linearized model 
- Panel data with country pair 
fixed effects 
- Intra-regional dummies 
AFTA: Not covered in study 
EU: Positive and significant at 10% level 
NAFTA: Positive and significant at 5% level 
 
The gravity model is commonly estimated in its log-linearized form using OLS 
regression. The log-linearized specification means that observations with zero values have to be 
dropped because the logarithm of zero is undefined. As pointed out by Helpman, Melitz and 
Rubinstein (2004), this introduces bias into the coefficient estimates. Some studies have tried to 
go around this problem used the Tobit model. There has also been recent suggestions to use the 
Heckman selection model  (for example, Linders and Groot (2006)) to correct for the bias of zero 
trade flows. 
A recent paper by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) pointed out a further problem with the log-
linearized specification. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the log-linearized model gives rise 
to endogeneity problems as well. They propose estimating the model in its multiplicative form 
using Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimator (PPMLE). The PPMLE has an added 
advantage of being able to deal with zero trade values. 
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Another consideration when specifying the empirical model is the specification of the 
RTA dummies to capture the various effects on trade. An intra-regional trade dummy is added to 
the gravity model to capture trade creation effects. Earlier studies, for example Frankel (1998), 
include another extra-regional dummy to capture trade diversion effects of the RTA. However, 
following Soloaga and Winters (2001), recent studies have added two extra-regional dummies to 
capture separately import and export diversion effects.  
The use of pooled or panel data is not new in gravity estimation. Pooled analysis is 
superior to cross-sectional analysis as it solves the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. The 
fixed effects model is used, although there are variations to the way fixed effect dummies are 
introduced. Cheng and Wall (2005) proposed two fixed effects for each pair of countries, one for 
each direction of trade. They show that alternative fixed-effects models proposed by Glick and 
Rose (2001), Mátyás (1997), and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) are special cases of our 
model and that the restrictions necessary to obtain these special cases are not supported 
statistically.  
Our study takes into account the issues raised in recent empirical studies. Details of our 
model specification are discussed in the following two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
GRAVITY MODEL 
2.1 Theoretical Model 
The most recent effort to derive the gravity model with micro-foundations is 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). They argue that trade between two regions is 
decreasing in their bilateral trade barrier relative to average barrier of the two regions to 
trade with all their partners.  This average trade barrier is referred to as “multilateral 
resistance”, compared with the bilateral resistance of trade. This multilateral resistance 
variable was often omitted from earlier gravity studies, which yield biased coefficients. 
The derivation of the gravity equation derived by Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) is as follows: 
Consumers in region j  maximize their utility, as modeled by following CES 
utility function: 
 ( )
( )/ 1
1 /1/
i ij
i
c
σ σ
σ σσβ
−
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  (2.1) 
subject to the budget constraint: 
∑ =
i
jijij Ycp  
where ijc  is the consumption by region j  consumers of goods from region i , σ  is the 
elasticity of substitution between all goods, iβ  is a positive distribution parameter, jY is 
the nominal income of region j  residents, and ijp  is the price of region i goods for 
region j consumers. 
This yields the nominal demand for region i  goods by region j consumers: 
 
( )1
i i ij
ij j
j
p t
X Y
P
σβ −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (2.2) 
where ip  denotes the exporter’s supply price, and ijt  the trade cost factor between i  and 
j . Thus, ijp is equivalent to ijitp . Bilateral trade barriers are captured by the trade cost 
factor ijt , where an increase in trade barriers is modeled by an increase in ijt . 
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jP  is the consumer price index of j  given by: 
 ( ) ( )1/ 1j i i ij
i
P p t
σβ −=∑  (2.3) 
This price index is the multilateral trade resistance, as it depends positively on 
trade barriers with all trading partners. 
Market clearance implies: 
 ( )1/ ,i ij i ij i j j
j j
Y X t p P Y i
σβ −= = ∀∑ ∑  (2.4) 
Assuming trade barriers are symmetric, ji tt = , it can be solved implicitly: 
 ( )1/ 1 ,i i i ip P iσβ θ −= ∀  (2.5) 
where θ = WiY
Y , which is region i ’s share of world income. 
Substituting (2.5) into (2.2) gives the gravity equation: 
 
1
i j ij
ij w
i j
YY t
X
Y PP
σ−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (2.6)  
which is subject to 
 1 1 1j i i ij
i
P P t jσ σ σθ− − −= ∀∑  (2.7) 
Equation (2.7) has to be solved implicitly. Equation (2.7) is also defined as the 
multilateral resistance term. 
 Assuming 1σ > 2 , from equation (2.6), it is apparent that as bilateral trade 
barriers, ijt  between two countries increases, the exports between the two countries 
decreases. However, for a given bilateral barrier, ijt , an increase of bilateral trade barriers 
between j  and other trading partners will cause 1jP
σ−  to decrease (equation (2.7)). This 
will in turn cause ijX to increase. Thus, trade between two countries is determined by 
bilateral trade barriers between themselves relative to trade barriers both countries face 
with all other trading partners.  This is one of the major contributions by Anderson and 
                                                 
2 Anderson and van Wincoop argue that the assumption of 1σ >  is consistent with empirical studies. 
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van Wincoop, highlighting that fact that the multilateral resistance term is required for 
correct specification of the gravity model.  
 
2.2 Empirical Model 
The stochastic version of Anderson and van Wincoop’s model can be written as 
follows: 
 
1
i j ij
ij ijw
i j
YY t
X
Y PP
σ
η
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (2.8) 
where ijη is the error factor with ( )| 1ijE regressorsη = , assumed to be statistically 
independent of the regressors. This leads to  
 ( )
1
| i j ijij w
i j
YY t
E X regressors
Y PP
σ−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (2.9) 
 Coefficients for gravity models are traditionally estimated using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression by first log-linearizing the model. The log-linear specification 
of equation (2.8) can be written as follows: 
 0 1 2 3 4 5ln ln ln ln ln ln lnij i j ij i j ijX Y Y t P Pα α α α α α η= + + + + + +  (2.10) 
 
2.2.1 Problems With OLS Estimation of Log-Linear Specification 
For consistent estimates, ( )ln | 0ijE regressorsη = . Since ( )| 1ijE regressorsη = , 
( )ln | ln1 0ijE regressorsη⎡ ⎤ = =⎣ ⎦ . However, Jensen’s inequality states that 
 ( ) ( )ln | ln |ij ijE regressors E regressorsη η⎡ ⎤≤ ⎣ ⎦  (2.11) 
Thus, the condition of ( )ln | 0ijE regressorsη =  may not always hold. 
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Further, ( )ln |ijE regressorsη  depends on mean and higher-order moments of the 
distribution of ijη 3 . Thus, if the variance of ijη depends on the regressors, then 
( )ln |ijE regressorsη  will also depend on regressors. This violates that condition for 
consistent estimates using OLS. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) found overwhelming 
evidence that the error terms in the log-linear specification of the gravity equation are 
heteroskedastic.  
A second problem with using the log-linearized specification is the presence of 
zero trade flows. It is not uncommon to find two countries with only unilateral trade 
flows (ie 0ijX > , but 0jiX = ) or zero bilateral trade flows (ie 0ij jiX X= = ). This poses 
a problem because zero-value observations do not occur randomly. Zero flows mostly 
occur for trade between small or distant countries. However, due to the traditional log-
linear specification of gravity models, observations with zero trade flows have to be 
dropped. A summary of the different approaches taken to deal with the problem of zero 
trade values is given below. 
                                                 
3 This can be shown by a Taylor series expansion about constant, a: 
( ) ( ) ( )1
1
1 ! 1ln ln 1
!
nn
ij ijn
n
n
a a
n a
η η∞ −
=
−= + − −∑  
For example, if a=1= ( )|ijE regressorsη , 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1
1
1
1 !
ln ln 1 |
!
1 !
ln | 1 | |
!
nn
ij ij ij
n
nn
ij ij ij
n
n
a E regressors
n
n
E regressors E E regressors regressors
n
η η η
η η η
∞ −
=
∞ −
=
−= + − −
− ⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑
∑
 
The above can be generalized for by taking  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1
1
1 !
ln ln 1 | |
!
nn
ij ij ij ij
n
n
a E regressors E regressors a
n
η η η η
∞
−
=
−= + − − + −∑  
In general, the expectation of a logarithm depends on the entire shape of the distribution (Jensen's 
inequality), and therefore on all higher order moments, when they exist. 
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Table 3: Methods for Dealing with Zero Trade Values 
Method Disadvantage 
Drop all observations 
with zero values 
Produce biased estimates (Helpman, Melitz and 
Rubinstein (2004)). 
Use ( )ln 1ijX +  as 
dependent variable 
It is not obvious how to recover ( )|ijE X regressors  from a linear model for 
( )ln( 1) |ijE X regressors+ ; results in biased 
estimates (Silva and Tenreyro (2006)). 
Use Tobit model Zero values in Tobit model occur when latent 
variable is less than or equal to zero. However, 
actual tradeflows can never be negative. 
Use Heckman two-step 
selection method 
Does not deal with endogeneity problem 
pointed out by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). 
 
2.2.2 Proposed Estimation Method 
The alternative to the log-linear specification would be to estimate the gravity 
model in its multiplicative form. For ease of discussion in this section, we re-write the 
deterministic gravity model as follows: 
 ( )'expk kX = Z α  (2.12) 
where kX  represents the k th observation of the dependent variable, X  
kZ  represents 1l×  vector of explanatory variables for the k th observation 
α  represents the 1l×  vector of coefficients 
 k  represents all possible combinations of country pairs, ( ),i j , where i j≠  
 l  represents the number of explanatory variables 
 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) propose using the Poisson Maximum Likelihood 
(PML) to estimate the parameters. We describe the Poisson model below. 
The density function of the Poisson distribution can be written as follows: 
 ˆPr
!
XeX X
X
μμ−⎡ ⎤= =⎣ ⎦  (2.13) 
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where μ  is the rate parameter. The Poisson model is usually used to estimate count data, 
which means  X  takes on non-negative integer values. 
The first two conditional moments of a Poisson distribution are 
 ( ) ( )| var |k k k k kE X X μ= =Z Z  (2.14) 
where kμ  is parameterized as 
 ( )'expk kμ = Z α  (2.15) 
Thus, ( ) ( )'var | expk k kX =Z Z α , indicating that the Poisson distribution is intrinsically 
heteroskedastic, thus addressing the heteroskedastic nature of the data employed in 
gravity studies. 
One main characteristic of the Poisson model is the equality of the mean and 
variance. Deviation from this property leads to over or under-dispersion, indicating a 
poor fit of data to the Poisson model. However, McCullagh and Nelder (1989) argue that 
if the precise mechanism of over-dispersion or under-dispersion is not known, it is 
convenient to assume [ ] ( ) ( )'var | exp |k k k k kX E Xα∝ =Z Z Z . Even relatively substantial 
errors in the assumed functional form of [ ]var |k kX Z  generally have only a small effect 
on conclusions (McCullagh and Nelder (1989) pg 199) and we will still obtain estimates 
that are asymptotically consistent. 
The log-likelihood function is 
 ( ) ( )' '
1
ln exp ln !
n
k k k k
k
L X
=
⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦∑α Z α Z α X  (2.16) 
This gives the following first order conditions for Poisson Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator (PMLE): 
 ( )'
1
exp
n
k k k
k
X
=
⎡ ⎤− =⎣ ⎦∑ Z a Z 0  (2.17) 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPMLE) is computationally the same as 
the estimate obtained from (2.17). From (2.17), we observe that the summation of the 
left-hand side has expectation zero if ( ) ( )'| expk k kE X =Z Z α . Thus, all that is needed for 
the PPMLE to be consistent is the correct specification of the conditional mean (Silva and 
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Tenreyro (2006), page 645). The added advantage is that the data need not be Poisson at 
all. Further, based on the result from Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon (1984), the 
dependent variable need not even be an integer. 
One last detail is the fact that the assumption [ ] ( )'var | expk k kX ∝Z Z α  is unlikely 
to hold. Thus, the PPMLE does not take fully into account the heteroskedasticity present 
in the model. Thus, for inference, we will need to rely on robust standard errors4. 
For our study, we will use the PPMLE. Besides dealing with the problem of 
inconsistency in the presence of heteroskedasticity, PPMLE also provides a natural way 
to deal with the problem of observations with zero values. 
The above can be easily extended to panel data. Wooldridge (1999) show that the 
fixed effects Poisson model is consistent very generally, where only the conditional mean 
need to be correctly specified. The proof of consistency of Poisson QCMLE (Quasi5 
Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimator) by Wooldridge (1999) is briefly shown in 
the following: 
Let ( ){ }, ,k k kφX Z be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables, where 
( )1,..., 'k k kTX X≡X  is a 1T ×  vector, ( )' ' '1 2, ,..., 'k k k kT≡Z Z Z Z  is a T l×  matrix, and kφ  is 
an unobserved scalar effect. Consider the model 
 ( ) ( )| , , , 1,...,kt k k k ktE X t Tφ φ μ= =Z Z α  (2.18) 
The conditional log-likelihood is 
 ( ) ( )
1
log ,
T
i kt t k
t
L X p
=
⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦∑a Z a  (2.19) 
where ( ) ( ), ,t k ktp μ≡Z a Z a ( )
1
, ,
T
kr
r
t rμ
=
⎛ ⎞ ≠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ Z a  
Consistency of the multinomial Pseudo Conditional Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator can be established by the following lemma: 
 
                                                 
4 Also known as Eicker-White standard errors. 
5 Note that “quasi” and “pseudo” maximum likelihood estimators are used interchangeably in the 
econometric literature. 
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Lemma 2.1 Let 1 2, ,..., TX X X  be non-negative random variables with finite, non-
zero means 0 0 01 2, ,..., Tμ μ μ , and let T++\  denote the subset of T-dimensional Euclidean 
space with strictly positive elements. Then ( )0 0 00 1 2, ,..., Tμ μ μ μ≡  is the unique solution to 
 0max log
T t tμ
μ μ
++∈\ 1 1
T T
r
t r
μ
= =
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  (2.20) 
 
From (2.19), ( ) ( ) ( )
1
| , , log ,
T
k k k k kt t k
t
E L pφ φ μ
=
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤=⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑a Z Z α Z a . By Lemma 2.1, 
αmaximizes ( ) | ,k k kE L φ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦a Z  for any ( ),k kφZ . The law of iterated expectations then 
shows that α maximizes ( )kE L⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦a  over the parameter space. Consistency then follows 
under a standard identification assumption and regularity of conditions that ensure the 
uniform weak law of large numbers holds. Again robust standard errors are required for 
inference. 
 
2.3 Variable Measures 
Rewriting equation (2.10) in exponential form gives 
 ( )0 1 2 3 4 5exp ln ln ln ln ln lnij i j ij i j ijX Y Y t P Pα α α α α α η= + + + + + +  (2.21) 
 
Based on the derivations in the preceding sections, the dependent variable, 
ijX represents exports of country i  to j . However, other measures have been used. For 
example, Soloaga and Winters (2001) used imports, while others have used the average 
of imports and exports. While import data is generally considered more reliable than 
export data (nations spend more on measuring import data to avoid tariff fraud), imports 
are recorded using c.i.f. prices, which are inclusive of transport costs. This results in 
endogeneity, as variables measuring transport costs will be correlated with the error term, 
yielding inconsistent estimates. To be consistent with theory and ensure consistency of 
estimates, we will rely on export data for our study. 
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For empirical estimation, the trade cost factor, ijt , is not observable. ijt  is usually 
modeled in a log-linear function in terms of observable ijd , the bilateral distance and 
ijτ for any other border effects between region i  and j  exists, giving: 
 1 2ln lnij ij ijt dρ ρ τ= +  (2.22) 
Traditionally, ijτ  includes various other factors that may affect trade costs. For example 
whether two countries are contiguous, share a common official language or had common 
colonial links. We model trade cost factor as follows: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6ln lnij ij ij ij ij i jt d CONT LANG COL LL LLρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ= + + + + +  (2.23) 
where 
ijCONT is a dummy that takes value 1 if countries i  and j are contiguous and 0 
otherwise; 
ijLANG is a dummy that takes value 1 if countries i  and j  share a common 
official language and 0 otherwise; 
ijCOL  is a dummy that takes value 1 if countries i  and j  had common colonial 
links and 0 otherwise; 
iLL  is a dummy that takes value 1 if country i  is landlocked and 0 otherwise; 
jLL  is a dummy that takes value 1 if country j  is landlocked and 0 otherwise. 
 
The consumer price index iP  is also unobservable. Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) proposed a methodology to solve for iP  which requires custom programming to 
perform constrained minimization, which is cumbersome, especially if the study involves 
multiple countries.  
The main argument of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is that trade between 
two regions is decreasing in their bilateral trade barrier relative to average barrier of the 
two regions to trade with all their partners.  This average trade barrier is referred to as 
“multilateral resistance”, as measured by the price indices. Other studies have used a 
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remoteness variable to proxy for multilateral resistance, and we follow Wei (1996) by 
using GDP-weighted average distance to all other countries: 
 h hi
h
REM w d=∑  (2.24) 
where 
REM is the remoteness measure 
hid  is the bilateral distance between countries i  and h  
h  is the trading partner; 
hw  is country h ’s share of world’s GDP 
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CHAPTER 3 
 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In previous gravity studies, results have differed based on whether cross-sectional data or 
pooled data was used. For example, Frankel (1998) does not find a significant impact of NAFTA 
on intra-NAFTA trade when the analysis is run on the cross-country sample, while he estimates 
that the NAFTA bloc increases trade by 43 per cent with respect to otherwise similar countries, 
when data are pooled over 1970-92 (as cited by Piermartini and Teh (2005)).  
However, it must be pointed out that cross-sectional analysis has its short-comings as it 
fails to control for unobserved heterogeneity among countries. This problem is mitigated by 
using panel data analysis.  
For our studies we will examine both cross-sectional and panel data covering the period 
1989 to 2005. The sections 3.1 and 3.2 discuss the two approaches in greater detail. Section 3.3 
details the data used in our analysis. 
 
3.1 Cross Sectional Analysis 
Exports from country i  to country j  is explained by the following equation: 
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8
9 10
exp( ln ln ln
ln ln
ln )
ij i j ij
ij ij ij i j
i j
ij
X Y Y d
CONT LANG COL LL LL
REM REM
α α α α
α α α α α
α α
η
= + + +
+ + + + +
+ +
+
 (3.1) 
In the empirical literature, this is often called the counterfactual, and it indicates the “normal” 
level of bilateral trade between two countries. For simplification of notation, we rewrite equation  
(3.1) as: 
 exp( ln )ij ij ijX E η= +  (3.2) 
To examine the effects RTAs on intra-regional trade, we need to introduce RTA dummies 
into the above equation, giving 
 1 2 3exp( ln )ij ij r r r r r r ij
r r r
X E REG EX IMβ β β η= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑  (3.3) 
where 
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r  indicates membership of the rth RTA 
REG is the intraregional trade dummy that takes on value 1 if both countries are 
members of rth RTA and 0 otherwise; 
EX is the export dummy that takes on value 1 if exporting country is member of rth RTA 
and 0 otherwise; 
IM is the import dummy that takes on value 1 if importing country is member of 
rth RTA and 0 otherwise; 
 
Coefficient 1rβ  captures the increase in intra-regional trade over and above that which is 
explained by the explanatory variables. Coefficient 2rβ captures the effect of general MFN trade 
liberalization and export diversion while coefficient 3rβ captures the effect of general MFN trade 
liberalization and import diversion. 2rβ  and 3rβ can be interpreted as “openness” of the region to 
trade. 
The approach for cross-sectional analysis we adopt is similar to Soloaga and Winters 
(2001). We perform 17 separate regressions (one for each year in the period 1989 to 2005). As 
mentioned earlier, the weakness of cross-sectional analysis is that unobserved characteristics of 
countries may be captured in the coefficients of the RTA dummies. As such, we seek to identify 
the ‘level’ effect of the RTAs on trade and the variation of their effect through time. To isolate 
the impact of RTAs, we would need to use panel data analysis. 
 
3.2 Panel Data Analysis 
To eliminate unobserved heterogeneity, we use a fixed effects model. We follow Cheng 
and Wall (2005) and specify two fixed effects for each pair of countries, one for each direction of 
trade. Due to this specification, bilateral variables that are constant over time (such as distance) 
will be dropped from the model. Additionally, the RTA dummies are also redefined to take on 
the value 1 only when the RTA comes into effect or when a major change to an RTA comes into 
effect. 
For our analysis, we will consider the impact of the RTA or change to RTA as detailed 
below: 
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Table 4: List of RTAs and Year of Inception or Change 
RTA Year Event 
AFTA 1992 Inception 
NAFTA 1994 Inception 
EU 1995 Expansion from EU12 to EU15 
MERCOSUR 1991 Inception 
ANDEAN 1991 Renewal 
CACM 1990 Renewal 
ANZCERTA 1990 Elimination of all tariff and quantitative restrictions 
 
The gravity equation for panel data analysis can be written as follows: 
 
0 1 2 3 4
1 2 3
exp( ln ln ln ln
ln )
ijt ij t i i j
r rt r rt r rt ijt
r r r
X Y Y REM REM
REG EX IM
γ λ α α α α α
β β β η
= + + + + + +
+ + + +∑ ∑ ∑  (3.4) 
where 
ijγ captures time-invariant fixed effects of unobserved country pair heterogeneity 
tλ  captures all time-varying heterogeneity that is shared among country pairs 
 
3.3 Data Sources 
We have a sample of 54 countries covering the period 1989 to 2005 (see Table 5) giving 
a total of 2862 observations per year for cross-sectional data and 48654 observations in total for 
panel data. The 54 countries account for 74% to 80% of total world exports each year. We obtain 
export data from UN COMTRADE. Of the 48654 observations, 1553 have zero export values.  
One major constraint in the selection of sample countries is the availability of complete 
data over the period covered. Due to incompleteness of data, we have exclude AFTA members 
Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos. However, as these five countries account for 
only about 5% of total ASEAN exports, the effect is negligible. For this study, AFTA will refer 
to the ASEAN-5 members of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
Similarly for EU15, we have also chosen to leave out Belgium and Luxemburg because of data 
availability. Belgium and Luxemburg account for less than 10% of total EU15 exports.  
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Table 5: List of countries in sample 
SOUTH AMERICA ASIA NORTH AMERICA EUROPE OTHERS 
MERCOSUR AFTA NAFTA EU15 Israel 
Argentina Indonesia Canada Denmark Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Brazil Malaysia Mexico France Morocco 
Paraguay Philippines United States Germany Tunisia 
Uruguay Singapore   Greece   
  Thailand CACM Ireland   
ANDEAN (Brunei) Costa Rica Italy   
Bolivia (Cambodia) Guatemala Netherlands   
Colombia (Laos) Honduras Portugal   
Ecuador (Myanmar) Nicaragua Spain   
Peru (Vietnam) (El Salvador) United Kingdom   
Venezuela     (Belgium)   
    Others (Lux)   
Others ANZCERTA Panama Accession in 1995   
Chile Australia   Austria   
  New Zealand   Finland   
      Sweden   
  Others       
  China   Others   
  Hong Kong   Cyprus   
  India   Hungary   
  Japan   Norway   
  Korea, Rep.   Poland   
  Taiwan, China   Switzerland   
      Turkey   
Note: The countries in brackets are members of the RTA, but are excluded from the study due 
 to lack of data 
 
We recognize the possibility of selection bias in our sample. However, the constraint of 
data availability is not easily resolved for studies involving trade data, and that remains a 
limitation in our study.  
Trade data also does not differentiate between zero and missing values. So when one 
comes across missing values, the data could really be missing, or it could mean zero trade flows. 
For our study, we assume that all missing values mean zero values.  
A further complication is this: even if UN COMTRADE reports the availability of export 
data for a particular country, it does not guarantee that data is complete. For example, even 
though Singapore exports are reported to be available in the UN COMTRADE database, the 
exports from Singapore to Indonesia for 1989 to 2002 were missing. In recognition of this, we 
also ran the analysis excluding observations involving exports from Singapore to Indonesia. 
GDP figures are from World Bank World Development Indicators. Geographical data is 
obtained from CEPII.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
4.1 Cross Sectional Analysis 
The coefficient estimates using OLS and PPMLE for cross-sectional data are summarized 
in Tables 12to 15 in the Appendix.  
We tested for heteroskedasticity in the data for each of the 17 years using White’s test. 
The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity was rejected at 1% level for all years. As pointed 
out by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the presence of heteroskedasticity leads to both inefficient and 
inconsistent OLS estimates.  
The signs of the coefficients produced by Poisson regression for the counterfactual 
variables are generally as expected. The coefficients for GDP are positive and highly significant 
throughout the period. Coefficients for distance are negative and highly significant throughout 
the period. Coefficients for contiguity and sharing a common language were positive and highly 
significant. Landlocked dummies had negative coefficients, though they were not always 
significant.  Coefficients for remoteness variables were positive and mostly highly significant. 
However, we note that the colonial-tie dummy had negative coefficients, although they were 
insignificant half of the time. It is arguable whether colonial ties will really lubricate the trade 
between two countries; also, the colonial ties dummy is an imperfect measure of the similarity of 
political-social characteristics and may cause a bias in the estimates. The OLS estimates for the 
colonial ties dummy were also insignificant throughout the whole period. 
As for OLS, the sign of the coefficients for GDP, distance, common language dummy, 
landlocked dummy for importer, and remoteness were as expected. The colony dummy was 
negative but insignificant. Contiguity was positive, but mostly insignificant, which is a bit of a 
surprise. The landlocked dummy for importer posted a positive and significant coefficient for 
from 2000 to 2005, counter to expectations.  
Thus overall, Poisson seems to do a better job for the geographical variables like 
contiguity and landlocked dummies. However, the negative coefficients for colonial dummy 
predicted by Poisson regression could warrant further investigation. 
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For ease of reference, the graphs of the coefficients for the RTA dummy variables are 
plotted over the 17 year period. We have included the graphs for the coefficients obtained by 
OLS for comparison purposes. 
 
Figure 2: Poisson and OLS Estimates for RTA Dummies 
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The graphs obtained for the case where we assume exports from Singapore to Indonesia 
from 1989 to 2002 were zero and the case where we exclude Singapore-Indonesia exports did 
not differ significantly. We report the coefficients for the Poisson estimates based on the former 
assumption in Tables 14 and 15, while Poisson estimates based on the latter are reported in 
Tables 16 and 17. 
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We observe that the graphs for Poisson estimates tend to be smoother than those for OLS. 
The “jumpiness” of the OLS coefficients could be a sign of the inconsistency present. Poisson 
could very well be painting a more realistic picture as one wouldn’t expect trading relationships 
between countries to experience too much fluctuation from year to year. 
The Poisson and OLS regressions paint rather different pictures for AFTA, NAFTA and 
EU15: 
- For AFTA, Poisson regression yields RTA dummy coefficients are generally 
insignificant. OLS, on the other hand, gives significantly positive regional export 
dummy coefficients. 
- For NAFTA, Poisson yields regional export dummy coefficients that are positive 
and significant while OLS yields regional import dummy coefficients that are 
negative and significant. 
- EU has positive and significant coefficients for the intraregional trade dummy 
using Poisson but negative and significant coefficients for the same using OLS. 
Coefficients for regional exports and imports under Poisson are generally 
insignificant, but are positive and significant under OLS. 
 
Of the three RTAs mentioned above, EU15 yielded the most contrasting results under the 
two different regressions. Poisson would suggest that EU15 member countries are trading more 
with each other compared to the rest of the world. However, OLS paints a picture of a very open 
region, with positive regional import and export dummy coefficients, and intraregional trade that 
is somewhat “underperforming” compared to trade with the rest of the world.  
The picture presented using Poisson regression of EU15 would perhaps present a more 
accurate picture of trade flows by the EU15 countries. The high level of openness depicted by 
OLS regression seems contrary to the fact that the stagnant economy and high unemployment 
rates of 1970s and 1980s precipitated protectionist policies in the Europe. The 1990s have seen 
positive attempts at lowering trade barriers, as pointed out by Hanson (1998), and Poisson 
regression depicts a region that is not significantly open compared to the rest of the world. Also, 
given the fact that EU15 is one of the most integrated trading blocs, it seems unreasonable that 
the intraregional trade dummy is significantly negative. 
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Interestingly, the pictures for MERCOSUR, ANDEAN, CACM and ANZCERTA are 
very similar, with significantly positive coefficients for intraregional trade dummies, but 
negative and generally significant coefficients for regional import and export dummies. This 
picture holds true for both Poisson and OLS methods. However, it seems that OLS tends to yield 
higher coefficients for the intraregional trade dummy. For example, the coefficients for 
ANDEAN are in the region of 0 to 1 for Poisson but are in the region of 1 to 2 for OLS. 
We would like to emphasize that the analysis of the levels do not indicate the 
effectiveness of the respective RTAs. To measure the impact of the RTA, we would need to 
analyze whether there has been a change in the coefficients in period before and after the RTA is 
effective. In the next subsection, we consider the impact of the RTAs by using panel data 
analysis. 
 
4.2 Panel Data Analysis 
Table 6: Coefficients for Panel Data Analysis 
   Poisson   OLS 
RTA Dummy Coef  Std Err  Coef   Std. Err
AFTA Intraregional  0.042  (0.153)  0.002    (0.080)
 Regional Exports 0.090  (0.070)  0.461 **  (0.037)
 Regional Imports -0.027  (0.051)  -0.034    (0.045)
          
NAFTA Intraregional  0.501** (0.121)  0.414 **  (0.084)
 Regional Exports -0.177** (0.027)  -0.088 **  (0.025)
 Regional Imports -0.046  (0.060)  0.139 **  (0.026)
          
EU15 Intraregional  -0.008  (0.039)  0.041    (0.026)
 Regional Exports 0.097** (0.035)  0.002    (0.021)
 Regional Imports 0.071  (0.044)  0.020    (0.032)
          
MERCOSUR Intraregional  0.190  (0.232)  0.068    (0.146)
 Regional Exports -0.113* (0.050)  -0.361 **  (0.058)
 Regional Imports 0.492** (0.050)  0.596 **  (0.057)
          
ANDEAN Intraregional  0.834** (0.157)  0.690 **  (0.170)
 Regional Exports -0.433** (0.070)  -0.247 **  (0.074)
 Regional Imports -0.042  (0.050)  0.279 **  (0.061)
          
CACM Intraregional  0.030  (0.247)  0.286    (0.260)
 Regional Exports 0.066  (0.104)  -0.160    (0.146)
Regional Imports 0.242* (0.106)  0.111    (0.114)
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   Poisson   OLS 
RTA Dummy Coef  Std Err  Coef   Std. Err
ANZCERTA Intraregional  0.400** (0.119)  0.283 *  (0.133)
 Regional Exports -0.092  (0.059)  0.003    (0.086)
 Regional Imports -0.166** (0.059)   -0.136     (0.075)
Note: (i) * Significant at 5% level; **Significant at 1% level 
 (ii) Robust standard error is used  
 
Panel analysis using Poisson regression reveals that AFTA was the only RTA which has 
had no significant impact on trade flows. NAFTA and ANDEAN both showed increased intra-
regional trade and export diversion. ANZCERTA showed increased intra-regional trade and 
import diversion.  Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden increased regional export flows for 
EU15; CACM showed increased regional import flows. 
OLS regressions are somewhat different from Poisson regressions. AFTA showed 
positive impact on regional exports. For NAFTA and ANDEAN, OLS shows increased regional 
export flows on top of increased intra-regional trade and export diversion. EU15 and CACM had 
no impact on all trade flows. MERCOSUR yielded similar results as Poisson. ANZCERTA had 
increased intraregional trade flows.  
In the context of Vinerian analysis of the welfare impact on RTAs, export diversion will 
have an impact on world welfare. Soloaga and Winters (2001) only found evidence of trade 
diversion for EU and EFTA. However, our study reveals that export diversion is more 
widespread, and is evident in NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ANDEAN. Thus, it is apparent that 
RTAs are may not be beneficial to world welfare. 
There is less evidence of import diversion, with only ANZCERTA posting a negative 
coefficient for the regional import dummy. 
The above analysis is robust even when we exclude Singapore-Indonesia exports (see 
Table 18 in Appendix for the Poisson estimates). 
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPLICATIONS FOR AFTA 
5.1 Evaluation of AFTA 
Table 7: Top 10 Export Destinations of ASEAN Exports for 1990 and 2005 
 1990   2005 
United States 20.1%  ASEAN5 23.3% 
Japan 18.5%  United States 14.2% 
ASEAN5 18.1%  EU15 12.0% 
EU15 16.0%  Japan 10.9% 
Hong Kong 4.6%  China 8.1% 
Taiwan 3.3%  Hong Kong 6.7% 
South Korea 3.2%  South Korea 3.9% 
Australia 1.9%  Taiwan 3.3% 
China 1.9%  Australia 3.1% 
India 1.2%  India 2.4% 
Source: Computed from UN Comtrade Database 
 
ASEAN-5 intra-regional trade accounts for 23.3 % of total ASEAN-5 exports in 2005, up 
from 18.1% in 1990. At first glance, it would seem that intraregional trade among AFTA 
members has improved. However, we have to bear in mind that the AFTA member countries 
have grown tremendously through the years, and trade volumes correspondingly increase with 
GDP growth. The results of the gravity model in the previous chapter has shown that after taking 
into account the GDP growth of AFTA member countries, AFTA members are not trading with 
each other more than what is expected. In fact, following the results from Poisson fixed effects 
panel regression, AFTA was the only RTA with insignificant impact on trade flows.  
Other studies have come to a similar conclusion that the preferential arrangement among 
AFTA members has not been effective operationally. As noted by Baldwin (2007), overall in 
1999, only 3% of total intra-ASEAN imports utilized ASEAN preferential rates (see Figure 3). 
The margin of preference given is too small to cover the administrative costs in complying with 
the rules of origin. 
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Figure 3: AFTA Utilization Rates (Percent of Intra-ASEAN imports) 
 
Source: PriceWaterhouseCooopers presentation to the 10th Meeting of the 
 ASEAN Directors-General Customs, 24 July 2002 (as cited by Baldwin (2007)) 
 
Another issue is the coverage of goods that are given preferential tariffs. The Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) is the main mechanism for AFTA. The CEPT-AFTA 
Agreement does not mandate all products undergo an immediate tariff reduction process. Each 
member of AFTA is allowed to have four types of product lists: an Inclusion List, a Temporary 
Exclusion List, a Sensitive List and a General Exception list. Only products in the Inclusion List 
are subject to immediate tariff reductions. Products in the General Exception List are 
permanently excluded from the tariff reduction process under the CEPT-AFTA Agreement.  
A key feature of AFTA is that the concessions are granted on a reciprocal, product-by-
product basis. Thus, AFTA actually does not provide for unconditional preference. For a product 
to enjoy CEPT concessions in an importing country, it must comply with the following 
conditions: 
- The product is on the Inclusion List of both the exporting and importing country 
- The tariff rate in the exporting country for the product is at or below 20 percent. If 
the tariff rate in the exporting country for the product is above 20 percent, the 
concessions can be given only when the CEPT tariff rate of the importing country 
for the same product is also above 20 percent 
- The product is an ASEAN product in line with the AFTA rules of origin 
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In a study by Hafez (2004), he noted that although 98.36% of all tariff lines of the 
ASEAN-6 (ASEAN-5 plus Brunei) are already in the Inclusion List, and the average CEPT-
Tariffs for these products were reduced from 12.76 percent in 1993 to 2.89 percent in 2002, 
approximately 1,600 products in the Inclusion List of the ASEAN-6 still have tariffs in excess of 
5 percent. Significantly, the CEPT tariff rates under AFTA and the MFN rates are the same for 
as much as two-thirds of the tariff lines in the Inclusion List. Thus, trade among AFTA members 
was not freer than trade with the rest of the world. 
 
Table 8: AFTA CEPT List for 2001 
Country Inclusion List Temporary 
Exclusion 
List 
General 
Exception 
List 
Sensitive List Total 
Indonesia 7,190 21 68 4 7,283
Malaysia 9,654 218 53 83 10,008
Philippines 5,622 6 16 50 5,694
Singapore 5,821 0 38 0 5,859
Thailand 9,104 0 0 7 9,111
Brunei 6,284 0 202 6 6,492
Total 43,675 245 377 150 44,447
Percentage 98.26% 0.55% 0.85% 0.34% 100.00%
Source: Hafez (2004) 
 
Apparently, even though RTAs are discriminatory in nature, AFTA has not conferred 
significant preferential tariff reductions to its members. This can be explained by the intense  
competition present among AFTA members. One indication of the intense competition among 
AFTA members is the strong similarity in their export structures. The export structures of the 
ASEAN-5 countries have become increasingly similar over the years. Following Lall and 
Albaladejo (2004), we measure the similarity in export structures between the ASEAN-5 
countries by comparing the correlation coefficients of the export structures. In 1990, the two 
countries with the most similar export structure were Singapore and Malaysia, posting a 
correlation coefficient of 0.72. By 2005, the export structures of Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand show great increase in similarity, with correlation coefficients that are 
0.80 or more. Even though Indonesia’s export structure was not as similar compared to the rest, 
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its correlation coefficients have increased vis-à-vis Philippines and Thailand. For NAFTA and 
EU15, even though the correlation of the member countries export structures have grown in 
similarity over the years, they do not display as high a correlation coefficient as AFTA. 
 
Table 9: Correlation Between Export Structures of AFTA, NAFTA and EU15 Member 
Countries for 1990 and 2005 
(a) AFTA 
   Year 1990   
 IDN MYS PHL SGP THA 
IDN 1.00     
MYS 0.49 1.00    
PHL 0.06 0.18 1.00   
SGP 0.45 0.72 0.12 1.00  
THA 0.08 0.31 0.29 0.35 1.00 
 
   Year 2005   
 IDN MYS PHL SGP THA 
IDN 1.00     
MYS 0.47 1.00    
PHL 0.25 0.89 1.00   
SGP 0.38 0.95 0.90 1.00  
THA 0.33 0.83 0.80 0.82 1.00 
 
(b) NAFTA 
 Year 1990 
 CAN MEX USA
CAN 1.00   
MEX 0.44 1.00  
USA 0.56 0.20 1.00 
 
 Year 2005 
 CAN MEX USA
CAN 1.00   
MEX 0.66 1.00  
USA 0.52 0.69 1.00 
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(c) EU15 
 Year 1990 
 AUT DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL ITA NLD PRT SWE 
AUT 1.00             
DEU 0.71 1.00            
DNK 0.36 0.35 1.00           
ESP 0.46 0.84 0.18 1.00          
FIN 0.58 0.29 0.12 0.15 1.00         
FRA 0.67 0.91 0.35 0.83 0.25 1.00        
GBR 0.62 0.71 0.42 0.59 0.23 0.76 1.00       
GRC 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.11 0.11 1.00      
IRL 0.16 0.18 0.34 0.04 -0.01 0.26 0.48 -0.04 1.00     
ITA 0.76 0.78 0.45 0.63 0.25 0.72 0.67 0.38 0.22 1.00    
NLD 0.37 0.47 0.52 0.44 0.19 0.49 0.68 0.24 0.52 0.45 1.00   
PRT 0.34 0.27 0.12 0.27 0.11 0.30 0.23 0.68 0.04 0.59 0.13 1.00  
SWE 0.77 0.80 0.30 0.67 0.73 0.72 0.60 -0.03 0.10 0.60 0.40 0.19 1.00 
 
 Year 2005 
 AUT DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL ITA NLD PRT SWE 
AUT 1.00                         
DEU 0.91 1.00                       
DNK 0.49 0.45 1.00                     
ESP 0.73 0.86 0.31 1.00                   
FIN 0.44 0.38 0.36 0.25 1.00                 
FRA 0.83 0.92 0.48 0.88 0.35 1.00               
GBR 0.73 0.77 0.73 0.62 0.50 0.74 1.00             
GRC 0.22 0.17 0.49 0.29 0.15 0.27 0.40 1.00           
IRL 0.15 0.23 0.35 0.07 0.02 0.25 0.41 0.12 1.00         
ITA 0.82 0.78 0.60 0.63 0.36 0.74 0.66 0.42 0.13 1.00       
NLD 0.34 0.45 0.49 0.34 0.32 0.43 0.67 0.35 0.60 0.37 1.00     
PRT 0.74 0.76 0.39 0.72 0.28 0.68 0.63 0.39 0.09 0.69 0.32 1.00   
SWE 0.82 0.82 0.56 0.69 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.24 0.15 0.67 0.40 0.65 1.00 
 
Due to the competitive environment, Baldwin (2007) argues that there was “rampant 
unilateralism” in East Asia, including ASEAN-5 countries in the bid to win investments. The rise 
of China only served to heighten the competition in the region. This outward orientation of 
ASEAN-5 countries coupled with intense competition amongst them erodes impact of AFTA. 
Another possible explanation for the poor showing in intraregional trade is the lack of 
complementarity of trade among ASEAN members. We calculate the trade complementarity 
index for the region to assess whether this is the case. The index of trade complementarity, ijC , 
between two countries i  and j  is defined as: 
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where kjx represents the share of good k in the exports of country j 
 kim represents the share of good k in the imports of country i 
 
The index is zero when no good exported by one country is imported by the other, and 1 
when the export-import shares exactly match. As such, it is assumed that higher index values 
indicate more favorable prospects for a successful trade arrangement between countries. The 
complementarity index was first used by Michaely (1994) to assess prospects for Latin American 
trade arrangements. The complementarity indices for AFTA, NAFTA and EU15 for the year 
1990 and 2005 are shown in Table 10. A simple comparison of the average complementarity 
indices reveal that AFTA is lagging behind the other two regions in terms of trade 
complementarity. AFTA posted an average of 0.40 and 0.55 for 1990 and 2005 respectively; 
NAFTA posted 0.62 and 0.72 for the respective years while EU15 posted 0.64 and 0.66. 
Although AFTA trade patterns have shown greater complementarity over the 15 year period, a 
gap remains between AFTA and the other two regions. 
 
Table 10: Complementarity Indices for AFTA, NAFTA and EU15 for Years 1990 and 2005 
(a) AFTA 
Year: 1990  Year: 2005 
  Importer    Importer 
  IDN MYS PHL SGP THA    IDN MYS PHL SGP THA
IDN  0.24 0.35 0.37 0.30   IDN  0.45 0.46 0.44 0.51 
MYS 0.34  0.43 0.63 0.44   MYS 0.36  0.64 0.73 0.58 
PHL 0.25 0.36  0.34 0.35   PHL 0.25 0.63  0.57 0.41 
SGP 0.44 0.55 0.53  0.55   SGP 0.46 0.78 0.74  0.67 Ex
po
rte
r 
THA 0.29 0.39 0.35 0.46    
Ex
po
rte
r 
THA 0.46 0.63 0.57 0.63  
Average for 1990: 0.40     Average for 2005: 0.55    
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(b) NAFTA 
Year: 1990  Year: 2005 
  Importer    Importer 
  CAN MEX USA    CAN MEX USA 
CAN  0.53 0.62  CAN  0.57 0.67 
MEX 0.55  0.60  MEX 0.72  0.78 
Ex
po
rte
r 
USA 0.74 0.70   E
xp
or
te
r 
USA 0.77 0.79  
Average for 1990: 0.62   Average for 2005: 0.72  
 
(c) EU15  
Year: 1990 
  Importer 
  AUT DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL ITA NLD PRT SWE 
AUT  0.66 0.70 0.64 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.61 0.66 0.64 0.72 
DEU 0.79  0.72 0.75 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.77 
DNK 0.61 0.61  0.62 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.58 0.64 
ESP 0.69 0.72 0.68  0.68 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.64 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.70 
FIN 0.54 0.54 0.59 0.55  0.54 0.54 0.57 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.55 
FRA 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.77 0.76  0.79 0.79 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.75 
GBR 0.74 0.77 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.80  0.75 0.78 0.75 0.79 0.72 0.81 
GRC 0.41 0.48 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.42  0.40 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.43 
IRL 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.51  0.55 0.54 0.45 0.49 
ITA 0.77 0.73 0.68 0.65 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.68 0.68  0.69 0.69 0.75 
NLD 0.65 0.76 0.74 0.71 0.70 0.76 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.75  0.65 0.70 
PRT 0.56 0.57 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.53  0.54 
Ex
po
rte
r 
SWE 0.71 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.65  
Average for 1990:  0.64            
 
Year: 2005 
  Importer 
  AUT DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL ITA NLD PRT SWE 
AUT  0.73 0.72 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.63 0.66 0.72 0.58 0.73 0.74 
DEU 0.79  0.71 0.76 0.72 0.76 0.73 0.66 0.68 0.73 0.63 0.74 0.76 
DNK 0.69 0.68  0.67 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.63 0.67 0.62 0.67 0.71 
ESP 0.72 0.70 0.72  0.66 0.74 0.71 0.70 0.63 0.72 0.61 0.73 0.72 
FIN 0.57 0.55 0.60 0.54  0.55 0.53 0.49 0.48 0.55 0.51 0.53 0.61 
FRA 0.79 0.75 0.74 0.78 0.73  0.73 0.75 0.69 0.73 0.65 0.76 0.78 
GBR 0.76 0.79 0.74 0.73 0.77 0.78  0.71 0.72 0.75 0.72 0.74 0.80 
GRC 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.56 0.59 0.55  0.51 0.63 0.55 0.64 0.58 
IRL 0.39 0.42 0.39 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.45 0.38  0.39 0.50 0.39 0.39 
ITA 0.76 0.70 0.76 0.68 0.66 0.72 0.70 0.65 0.64  0.59 0.71 0.72 
NLD 0.68 0.74 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.70 0.68 0.74 0.69  0.69 0.71 
PRT 0.72 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.63 0.66 0.73 0.62 0.62 0.71 0.57  0.69 
Ex
po
rte
r 
SWE 0.74 0.70 0.71 0.68 0.72 0.67 0.71 0.62 0.60 0.71 0.59 0.69  
Average for 2005:  0.66            
Source: Calculated using data from UN Comtrade database 
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5.2 Effect of RTAs on AFTA Trade Flows 
From Table 7, we can see that the decline in share of AFTA exports to US and EU15 is 
apparent. From the analysis in the earlier chapters, we noted that there was no evidence of import 
diversion for NAFTA and expansion of EU12 to EU15. Thus, we are not able to attribute the 
decline to the formation of trading blocs. 
A plausible explanation for the decline in export share to US and EU15 would likely be 
due to the increased competition AFTA members face from the rise of China. However, the flip 
side of competition with China is the increased avenue for regional co-operation. As it is, 
China’s share of AFTA’s exports has increased from 1.9% in 1990 to 8.1% in 2005. In line with 
this, ASEAN has recognized China’s importance in the region and has managed to form the 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), which became effective in July 2003. We shall 
discuss the impact of this RTA with China together with the more recent developments in the 
following subsection. 
 
5.3 Recent Developments 
In the face of the stalling of the Doha round of trade talks, the proliferation of RTAs 
continued from the 1990s into the new millennium. The ACFTA was effective July 2003. 
Singapore has also taken an active role in forming bilateral trade agreements with its trading 
partners. AFTA’s major trading partners US and EU were also involved in new RTAs, for 
example, EC-Mexico and US-Chile bilateral agreements. The following table summarizes the 
impact of the recent RTAs6. 
                                                 
6 Estimates were obtained using a sample of 98 countries over the period 1996 to 2005 (See Appendix Table 18 for 
complete list). We could increase the sample countries as data was more complete in the recent decade. The 
methodology follows what is described in Chapter 3. 
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Table 11: Impact of Recent RTAs 
   Poisson  OLS 
RTA Dummy Coef  Std Err Coef   Std Err 
ACFTA Intraregional -0.125 (0.132) -0.150**  (0.055) 
 Regional exports 0.328** (0.054) 0.277**  (0.024) 
 Regional imports 0.248** (0.059) 0.212**  (0.037) 
      
Japan-S’pore Intraregional -0.093  (0.077) -0.233**  (0.087) 
 Regional exports -0.044  (0.057) -0.156**  (0.026) 
 Regional imports-0.021  (0.042) 0.134**  (0.048) 
      
New Zealand-S’pore Intraregional 0.164  (0.156) -0.221   (0.134) 
 Regional exports -0.043  (0.062) 0.154**  (0.043) 
 Regional imports-0.075* (0.034) -0.014   (0.052) 
      
S’pore Australia Intraregional 0.040  (0.227) -0.288   (0.173) 
 Regional exports -0.049  (0.065) 0.021   (0.040) 
 Regional imports-0.148** (0.044) -0.008   (0.056) 
      
US-S’pore Intraregional -0.148  (0.139) -0.312**  (0.091) 
 Regional exports -0.053  (0.065) -0.243**  (0.049) 
 Regional imports-0.018  (0.050) 0.092   (0.078) 
      
      
EU15 to EU25 expansion Intraregional 0.011  (0.046) -0.094*  (0.037) 
 Regional exports 0.253** (0.041) 0.315**  (0.034) 
 Regional imports 0.018  (0.045) 0.057   (0.034) 
      
EC-Mexico Intraregional -0.114** (0.033) -0.052*  (0.023) 
 Regional exports 0.064** (0.016) 0.002   (0.012) 
 Regional imports 0.086** (0.023) 0.051**  (0.017) 
      
US-Chile Intraregional 0.236  (0.136) 0.047   (0.086) 
 Regional exports -0.154* (0.068) 0.135*  (0.060) 
 Regional imports-0.009   (0.057)  -0.046    (0.070) 
Note: (i) * Significant at 5% level; **Significant at 1% level 
 (ii) Robust standard error is used 
 
With reference to the results obtained using Poisson regression, both Japan-Singapore 
FTA and USA-Singapore FTA did not register any significant impact on trade flows.  New 
Zealand-Singapore FTA and Singapore-Australia FTA both show signs of import diversion. 
United States-Chile FTA shows signs of export diversion. EC-Mexico FTA decreased intra-
regional trade but increased regional exports and imports. Expansion of EU15 to EU25 increased 
regional exports. ACFTA increased both regional exports and imports. 
Unfortunately, the agreement between Singapore and major trading partners US and 
Japan did not have any impact on trade flows. As for Singapore’s agreements with Australia and 
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New Zealand, there is unfortunately evidence of import diversion, though disappointingly, both 
agreements did not affect intraregional trade flows. 
With regards to major trading partners US and EU, there is again no evidence of import 
diversion due to new RTAs that were entered into by them. EU expansion to include ten new 
members in 2004 also did not show evidence of trade diversion. Thus, AFTA’s exports to these 
two partners are not adversely affected by the new RTAs per se. However, US-Chile RTA shows 
signs of export diversion, which affects worldwide welfare. 
Even when Singapore-Indonesia exports were excluded, the above analysis still holds. 
The minor difference that arises is that ACFTA now shows a significant negative impact on 
intra-regional trade flows. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
We re-evaluate the impact of RTAs on trade flows in view of the concerns of the possible 
bias and inconsistency of the traditional OLS estimation method. We find evidence of trade 
diversion for NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ANDEAN and US-Chile RTAs. The expansions of EU12 
to EU15 and subsequently from EU15 to EU25 were benign, with no signs of trade diversion. 
The RTAs entered into by the US were less benign, with NAFTA and US-Chile FTA showing 
signs of export diversion, which adversely affect welfare for rest of the world. 
With regards to AFTA, the new estimation method reveals that AFTA has had no 
significant impact on trade flows. The increase in share of intra-regional trade can basically be 
explained by the high growths of AFTA member countries, after controlling for distance and 
other trade related costs. The declining share of trade with major trading partners US and EU 
cannot be directly attributed to the RTAs which they have entered into as there is no evidence of 
import diversion. Unfortunately, the new RTAs that AFTA and Singapore entered into from 
2000 onwards were generally not effective in promoting intraregional trade. The overall picture 
one gets about AFTA is that is has not had much impact on intraregional trade. 
The ineffectiveness of AFTA on fostering intraregional trade can be attributed to a few 
major factors. Utilization rates of AFTA preferential rates are low, which is not surprising, given 
the fact that CEPT tariff scheme does not confer significant preferential treatment to AFTA 
members. The intense competition among member countries given the similarity of their export 
structures and markets take the wind out of the sails of regional integration. Even though 
complementarity of exports for ASEAN-5 members has improved over the years, AFTA is still 
lagging behind NAFTA and EU. 
Despite the apparent lack of effectiveness of AFTA, the growth of RTAs in the region 
does not see any signs of abating. Besides the ASEAN-China FTA, ASEAN is actively pursuing 
free trade agreements with Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. A “hub-and spoke” model 
of regional integration seems to be emerging. However, it remains to be seen whether these will 
facilitate regional trade or serve to confound further the “spaghetti bowl” of RTAs in the region. 
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APPENDICES 
Table 12: OLS Coefficients for Cross Sectional Analysis (Counterfactual Variables) 
 
Variable 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Ln(GDP of Exporter) 1.185** 1.225** 1.237** 1.250** 1.305** 1.293** 1.273** 1.282** 1.314** 1.307** 1.317** 1.314** 1.314** 1.319** 1.337** 1.337** 1.369**
 (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.025)  
Ln(GDP of Importer) 0.807** 0.815** 0.799** 0.818** 0.833** 0.840** 0.857** 0.844** 0.842** 0.828** 0.859** 0.871** 0.881** 0.901** 0.904** 0.912** 0.945**
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.023)  
Ln(Distance) -0.943** -1.024** -1.046** -0.996** -1.039** -1.043** -1.043** -1.097** -1.085** -1.047** -1.092** -1.097** -1.128** -1.143** -1.111** -1.126** -1.161**
 (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.043)  
Contiguity 0.496** 0.325 * 0.314 * 0.281  0.309 * 0.239  0.150  0.130  0.183  0.170   0.155  0.183  0.156  0.070  0.115  0.110  0.100  
 (0.161)  (0.163)  (0.152)  (0.149)  (0.145)  (0.142)  (0.137)  (0.131)  (0.133)  (0.130)  (0.135)  (0.136)  (0.141)  (0.141)  (0.144)  (0.146)  (0.145)  
Common Language 0.895** 0.904** 0.905** 0.878** 0.971** 0.960** 0.966** 0.959** 0.907** 0.895** 0.883** 0.916** 0.944** 1.006** 0.951** 0.971** 0.952**
 (0.112)  (0.112)  (0.102)  (0.106)  (0.100)  (0.095)  (0.096)  (0.095)  (0.093)  (0.090)  (0.091)  (0.092)  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.091)  (0.091)  (0.093)  
Colony -0.029   -0.102   -0.059  -0.051  -0.075  -0.038  -0.027  0.019  0.022  0.028   0.011  -0.039  -0.072  -0.145  -0.113  -0.186  -0.161  
 (0.148)  (0.162)  (0.124)  (0.133)  (0.125)  (0.124)  (0.125)  (0.126)  (0.125)  (0.124)  (0.121)  (0.115)  (0.116)  (0.118)  (0.130)  (0.141)  (0.136)  
Landlocked (Exporter) 0.195   0.219   0.122  -0.071  -0.141  -0.165  -0.107  -0.121  -0.032  0.071   0.095  0.219 * 0.392** 0.248 * 0.360** 0.405** 0.406**
 (0.129)  (0.122)  (0.118)  (0.110)  (0.113)  (0.106)  (0.103)  (0.111)  (0.107)  (0.110)  (0.105)  (0.101)  (0.103)  (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.101)  (0.104)  
Landlocked (Importer) -0.462** -0.192   -0.315** -0.357** -0.311** -0.406** -0.381** -0.474** -0.432** -0.375** -0.423** -0.475** -0.484** -0.489** -0.475** -0.469** -0.468**
 (0.121)  (0.113)  (0.108)  (0.106)  (0.106)  (0.111)  (0.100)  (0.104)  (0.106)  (0.102)  (0.104)  (0.110)  (0.110)  (0.111)  (0.108)  (0.111)  (0.114)  
Ln(Remoteness of Exporter) 1.146** 1.189** 1.337** 1.038** 1.082** 1.040** 1.755** 1.794** 1.760** 2.001** 1.764** 2.183** 2.283** 2.119** 2.480** 2.552** 2.644**
 (0.230)  (0.207)  (0.207)  (0.201)  (0.219)  (0.210)  (0.223)  (0.225)  (0.223)  (0.202)  (0.213)  (0.227)  (0.225)  (0.212)  (0.205)  (0.200)  (0.208)  
Ln(Remoteness of Importer) 0.821** 1.017** 1.086** 1.036** 1.093** 1.167** 1.307** 1.265** 1.116** 0.802** 0.965** 0.830** 0.970** 1.158** 1.139** 1.533** 1.576**
 (0.240)  (0.226)  (0.222)  (0.211)  (0.224)  (0.227)  (0.227)  (0.229)  (0.222)  (0.204)  (0.216)  (0.245)  (0.230)  (0.207)  (0.211)  (0.209)  (0.211)  
                                   
White’s Test 657.8  671.7  506.8  639.2  629.6  616.6  686.1  712.6  676.9  647.2  621.2  645.1  610.6  690.6  656.6  800.4  489.3  
pvalue 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
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Table 13: OLS Coefficients for Cross-Sectional Analysis (RTA Dummies)  
RTA Dummy 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
AFTA Intraregional 0.699 * 0.383   0.187  0.210  0.105  0.232  0.263  0.151  0.395   0.568 ** 0.485 * 0.465  0.108  0.397  0.524 * 0.514 * 0.572 *
  (0.313)  (0.322)  (0.310)  (0.309)  (0.306)  (0.293)  (0.268)  (0.261)  (0.250)  (0.218)  (0.245)  (0.242)  (0.241)  (0.245)  (0.251)  (0.240)  (0.249)  
 Regional export 0.289   0.331 * 0.387** 0.506** 0.691** 0.625** 0.589** 0.552** 0.570** 0.950 ** 0.925** 0.791** 0.800** 0.720** 0.603** 0.576** 0.528**
  (0.156)  (0.165)  (0.147)  (0.139)  (0.135)  (0.131)  (0.128)  (0.130)  (0.131)  (0.126)  (0.126)  (0.127)  (0.125)  (0.124)  (0.123)  (0.122)  (0.137)  
 Regional import -0.041   0.203   0.067  0.065  0.016  -0.019  -0.028  0.084  0.013   0.115  0.082  0.226  0.417** 0.085  0.087  -0.118  -0.185  
  (0.151)  (0.154)  (0.147)  (0.142)  (0.151)  (0.140)  (0.138)  (0.137)  (0.142)  (0.142)  (0.141)  (0.145)  (0.137)  (0.132)  (0.141)  (0.139)  (0.142)  
NAFTA Intraregional -0.039   -0.102   0.019  0.280  0.330  0.455  0.741  0.465  0.390   0.463  0.571  0.531  0.555  0.538  0.495  0.466  0.294  
  (0.340)  (0.372)  (0.347)  (0.369)  (0.399)  (0.384)  (0.438)  (0.444)  (0.425)  (0.397)  (0.414)  (0.400)  (0.396)  (0.402)  (0.397)  (0.405)  (0.406)  
 Regional export -0.606** -0.671 ** -0.853** -0.952** -1.090** -1.143** -0.559** -0.378** -0.467** -0.499 ** -0.747** -0.677** -0.664** -0.839** -0.812** -0.951** -0.835**
  (0.123)  (0.122)  (0.118)  (0.120)  (0.124)  (0.117)  (0.113)  (0.101)  (0.104)  (0.108)  (0.120)  (0.119)  (0.127)  (0.126)  (0.112)  (0.123)  (0.106)  
 Regional import -0.056   0.086   0.050  0.145  0.140  0.162  -0.104  0.075  0.107   0.216  0.187  0.167  0.175  0.152  0.091  0.180  0.118  
  (0.157)  (0.159)  (0.160)  (0.131)  (0.133)  (0.119)  (0.135)  (0.133)  (0.132)  (0.136)  (0.132)  (0.135)  (0.162)  (0.142)  (0.133)  (0.122)  (0.125)  
EU15 Intraregional -0.156   -0.326 * -0.257  -0.231  -0.446** -0.416** -0.299 * -0.344** -0.313** -0.254 * -0.241 * -0.302 * -0.348** -0.331** -0.313** -0.298 * -0.360**
  (0.133)  (0.133)  (0.133)  (0.128)  (0.131)  (0.128)  (0.116)  (0.116)  (0.119)  (0.116)  (0.117)  (0.117)  (0.119)  (0.117)  (0.115)  (0.118)  (0.120)  
 Regional export 0.151   0.124   -0.016  -0.116  0.023  0.021  0.479** 0.513** 0.511** 0.524 ** 0.403** 0.592** 0.621** 0.489** 0.521** 0.416** 0.458**
  (0.098)  (0.093)  (0.094)  (0.089)  (0.087)  (0.082)  (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.091)  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.087)  (0.092)  (0.089)  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.090)  
 Regional import 0.371** 0.540 ** 0.471** 0.470** 0.471** 0.452** 0.314** 0.353** 0.326** 0.346 ** 0.320** 0.320** 0.353** 0.300** 0.254 * 0.303** 0.264 *
  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.101)  (0.097)  (0.094)  (0.096)  (0.095)  (0.099)  (0.097)  (0.096)  (0.098)  (0.098)  (0.101)  (0.100)  (0.098)  (0.103)  (0.102)  
MERCOSUR Intraregional 1.487** 1.243 ** 1.110** 1.349** 1.415** 1.452** 1.382** 1.500** 1.422** 1.686 ** 1.413** 1.602** 1.443** 1.540** 1.730** 1.461** 1.324**
  (0.386)  (0.425)  (0.403)  (0.377)  (0.399)  (0.393)  (0.413)  (0.439)  (0.417)  (0.400)  (0.420)  (0.456)  (0.494)  (0.485)  (0.499)  (0.504)  (0.484)  
 Regional export -0.154   -0.296   -0.587** -0.486** -0.686** -0.799** -0.810** -0.900** -0.848** -1.078 ** -0.762** -0.952** -0.713** -0.069  -0.071  -0.209  -0.355 *
  (0.156)  (0.155)  (0.148)  (0.150)  (0.154)  (0.149)  (0.148)  (0.150)  (0.142)  (0.132)  (0.136)  (0.135)  (0.136)  (0.139)  (0.135)  (0.140)  (0.143)  
 Regional import -1.459** -1.337 ** -1.193** -1.099** -0.916** -0.765** -0.927** -0.827** -0.773** -0.563 ** -0.679** -0.570** -0.632** -0.739** -0.862** -0.774** -0.863**
  (0.178)  (0.178)  (0.164)  (0.162)  (0.162)  (0.156)  (0.166)  (0.156)  (0.154)  (0.149)  (0.145)  (0.155)  (0.149)  (0.140)  (0.170)  (0.149)  (0.149)  
ANDEAN Intraregional 1.108** 0.994 ** 1.133** 1.672** 1.529** 1.614** 1.718** 1.789** 1.897** 2.033 ** 2.081** 2.081** 1.920** 1.774** 2.098** 2.087** 1.973**
  (0.324)  (0.326)  (0.293)  (0.258)  (0.285)  (0.296)  (0.239)  (0.275)  (0.266)  (0.255)  (0.301)  (0.263)  (0.270)  (0.266)  (0.252)  (0.263)  (0.265)  
 Regional export -0.620** -0.278   -0.622** -0.764** -0.588** -0.732** -0.811** -0.770** -0.850** -0.941 ** -0.679** -0.770** -0.749** -0.676** -0.747** -0.999** -0.930**
  (0.163)  (0.156)  (0.163)  (0.160)  (0.152)  (0.150)  (0.150)  (0.158)  (0.152)  (0.136)  (0.141)  (0.152)  (0.144)  (0.137)  (0.136)  (0.139)  (0.144)  
 Regional import -1.153** -1.032 ** -0.809** -0.704** -0.769** -0.753** -0.801** -0.851** -0.803** -0.558 ** -0.857** -0.746** -0.652** -0.641** -0.832** -0.879** -0.882**
  (0.148)  (0.149)  (0.136)  (0.132)  (0.137)  (0.122)  (0.125)  (0.125)  (0.121)  (0.111)  (0.115)  (0.114)  (0.121)  (0.102)  (0.110)  (0.112)  (0.117)  
CACM Intraregional 2.478** 2.348 ** 2.718** 2.966** 2.818** 2.757** 2.551** 2.682** 2.719** 2.725 ** 2.380** 2.670** 2.778** 2.801** 2.815** 2.874** 2.784**
  (0.381)  (0.402)  (0.354)  (0.352)  (0.291)  (0.299)  (0.349)  (0.284)  (0.262)  (0.293)  (0.286)  (0.283)  (0.314)  (0.262)  (0.254)  (0.254)  (0.263)  
 Regional export -0.397   -0.099   -0.499 * -0.743** -0.466 * -0.623** -0.423 * -0.326  -0.118   -0.121  -0.248  -0.391 * -0.569** -0.627** -0.569** -0.763** -0.464 *
  (0.204)  (0.218)  (0.200)  (0.199)  (0.181)  (0.189)  (0.200)  (0.182)  (0.182)  (0.176)  (0.181)  (0.177)  (0.180)  (0.183)  (0.185)  (0.188)  (0.187)  
 Regional import -0.772** -0.551 ** -0.833** -0.495** -0.453** -0.625** -0.742** -0.683** -0.621** -0.348 ** -0.203  -0.311 * -0.312 * -0.248  -0.211  -0.178  -0.238  
  (0.169)  (0.171)  (0.166)  (0.151)  (0.150)  (0.149)  (0.153)  (0.152)  (0.143)  (0.132)  (0.136)  (0.137)  (0.139)  (0.140)  (0.135)  (0.135)  (0.149)  
ANZCERTA Intraregional 1.369** 1.565 ** 1.575** 1.727** 1.525** 1.513** 1.548** 1.335** 1.200** 1.202 ** 1.253** 1.273** 1.079** 0.880** 1.156** 1.122** 0.997**
  (0.347)  (0.389)  (0.406)  (0.383)  (0.385)  (0.349)  (0.288)  (0.275)  (0.269)  (0.303)  (0.269)  (0.288)  (0.277)  (0.249)  (0.253)  (0.257)  (0.263)  
 Regional export -0.851** -0.772 ** -0.821** -0.555** -0.497 * -0.513 * -0.809** -0.851** -0.714** -0.784 ** -0.784** -0.808** -0.691** -0.739** -1.297** -1.519** -1.512**
  (0.229)  (0.222)  (0.219)  (0.213)  (0.224)  (0.211)  (0.208)  (0.216)  (0.204)  (0.185)  (0.194)  (0.194)  (0.188)  (0.185)  (0.188)  (0.186)  (0.189)  
 Regional import -0.473 * -0.798 ** -0.933** -0.843** -0.706** -0.745** -0.957** -0.757** -0.613** -0.363  -0.355  -0.383  -0.471 * -0.539** -0.726** -1.057** -1.102**
 (0.213)  (0.240)  (0.249)  (0.232)  (0.216)  (0.204)  (0.212)  (0.200)  (0.197)  (0.194)  (0.190)  (0.211)  (0.209)  (0.188)  (0.198)  (0.206)  (0.208)  
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Table 14: Poisson Coefficients for Cross-Sectional Analysis (Counterfactual Variables) 
Variable 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Ln(GDP of Exporter) 0.852** 0.850** 0.851** 0.842** 0.834** 0.823** 0.801** 0.802** 0.809** 0.813** 0.799** 0.804** 0.795** 0.798** 0.791** 0.788** 0.799**
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) 
Ln(GDP of Importer) 0.771** 0.772** 0.754** 0.744** 0.753** 0.749** 0.746** 0.759** 0.754** 0.758** 0.761** 0.777** 0.788** 0.784** 0.775** 0.765** 0.776**
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033) 
Ln(Distance) -0.733** -0.742** -0.738** -0.710** -0.693** -0.699** -0.661** -0.666** -0.664** -0.644** -0.662** -0.681** -0.690** -0.713** -0.733** -0.738** -0.748**
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) 
Contiguity 0.609** 0.588** 0.654** 0.646** 0.613** 0.625** 0.616** 0.611** 0.622** 0.637** 0.646** 0.675** 0.669** 0.685** 0.656** 0.683** 0.700**
 (0.147) (0.142) (0.151) (0.162) (0.166) (0.165) (0.156) (0.154) (0.159) (0.143) (0.141) (0.153) (0.153) (0.157) (0.165) (0.169) (0.177) 
Common Language 0.653** 0.683** 0.716** 0.763** 0.779** 0.765** 0.720** 0.677** 0.620** 0.552** 0.536** 0.515** 0.527** 0.579** 0.596** 0.578** 0.572**
 (0.144) (0.142) (0.146) (0.157) (0.149) (0.149) (0.153) (0.154) (0.150) (0.142) (0.143) (0.146) (0.144) (0.146) (0.153) (0.155) (0.156) 
Colony -0.215 * -0.223 * -0.289 * -0.279 * -0.256 * -0.263 * -0.232  -0.204  -0.185  -0.120   -0.109  -0.113  -0.147  -0.214  -0.274 * -0.292 * -0.319 *
 (0.109) (0.111) (0.116) (0.123) (0.122) (0.119) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.119) (0.116) (0.118) (0.115) (0.123) (0.128) (0.133) (0.134) 
Landlocked (Exporter) -0.386 * -0.429 * -0.520** -0.488 * -0.526** -0.579** -0.476** -0.420** -0.324 * -0.191   -0.223  -0.264  -0.254  -0.264  -0.280  -0.312  -0.326  
 (0.176) (0.178) (0.189) (0.202) (0.182) (0.185) (0.163) (0.161) (0.159) (0.147) (0.151) (0.158) (0.156) (0.161) (0.165) (0.167) (0.170) 
Landlocked (Importer) -0.110   -0.177   -0.197  -0.248  -0.338  -0.355  -0.411 * -0.363 * -0.322 * -0.201   -0.192  -0.170  -0.164  -0.240  -0.250  -0.275  -0.253  
 (0.183) (0.177) (0.184) (0.193) (0.195) (0.194) (0.159) (0.154) (0.154) (0.145) (0.143) (0.154) (0.152) (0.157) (0.162) (0.166) (0.170) 
Ln(Remoteness of Exporter) 1.464** 1.267** 1.358** 1.468** 1.482** 1.385** 1.797** 1.812** 1.742** 1.858** 1.799** 1.792** 1.635** 1.770** 1.854** 1.869** 1.869**
 (0.347) (0.313) (0.319) (0.362) (0.426) (0.429) (0.467) (0.487) (0.483) (0.412) (0.451) (0.499) (0.473) (0.472) (0.458) (0.442) (0.444) 
Ln(Remoteness of Importer) 1.104** 1.069** 1.254** 1.297** 1.094** 1.236** 1.291** 1.164** 1.078** 0.801 * 0.854 * 1.076** 0.973 * 1.076** 1.254** 1.324** 1.298**
 (0.362) (0.335) (0.346) (0.344) (0.338) (0.357) (0.343) (0.344) (0.364) (0.345) (0.365) (0.411) (0.378) (0.363) (0.348) (0.341) (0.344) 
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Table 15: Poisson Coefficients for Cross-Sectional Analysis (RTA Dummies) 
RTA Dummy 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
AFTA Intraregional -0.078   -0.226   -0.268  -0.289  -0.279  -0.190  -0.212  -0.236  -0.269   -0.110  -0.132  -0.195  -0.189  -0.213  -0.057  -0.067  -0.079  
  (0.324) (0.315) (0.304) (0.286) (0.286) (0.298) (0.293) (0.277) (0.259) (0.224) (0.242) (0.243) (0.237) (0.240) (0.249) (0.249) (0.253) 
 Regional export 0.213   0.309   0.284  0.207  0.216  0.242  0.120  0.136  0.198   0.422  0.370  0.362  0.362  0.232  0.144  0.080  0.112  
  (0.237) (0.229) (0.226) (0.239) (0.250) (0.245) (0.239) (0.241) (0.238) (0.222) (0.228) (0.238) (0.236) (0.238) (0.240) (0.234) (0.232) 
 Regional import 0.241   0.372   0.258  0.210  0.336  0.318  0.340  0.351  0.396 * 0.486 * 0.482 * 0.479 * 0.484 * 0.355  0.208  0.147  0.153  
  (0.232) (0.227) (0.230) (0.226) (0.204) (0.204) (0.191) (0.185) (0.192) (0.197) (0.200) (0.206) (0.200) (0.202) (0.204) (0.202) (0.206) 
NAFTA Intraregional -1.047** -0.947** -0.994** -0.777 * -0.622 * -0.541  -0.418  -0.341  -0.276   -0.130  -0.164  -0.213  -0.197  -0.264  -0.271  -0.273  -0.328  
  (0.295) (0.298) (0.298) (0.312) (0.295) (0.294) (0.304) (0.307) (0.299) (0.282) (0.282) (0.290) (0.284) (0.296) (0.316) (0.328) (0.331) 
 Regional export 0.074   0.000   -0.021  -0.051  -0.079  -0.111  0.076  0.176  0.185   0.219  0.172  0.148  0.143  0.050  -0.052  -0.147  -0.169  
  (0.151) (0.144) (0.137) (0.147) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.158) (0.175) (0.174) (0.179) (0.194) (0.200) (0.204) (0.195) (0.193) (0.199) 
 Regional import 0.586** 0.502** 0.502** 0.510** 0.452** 0.499** 0.425** 0.397** 0.447** 0.489** 0.551** 0.588** 0.513** 0.534** 0.484** 0.464** 0.465**
  (0.157) (0.149) (0.145) (0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.133) (0.137) (0.145) (0.149) (0.148) (0.160) (0.161) (0.158) (0.153) (0.151) (0.152) 
EU15 Intraregional 0.588** 0.538** 0.552** 0.596** 0.550** 0.549** 0.734** 0.697** 0.664** 0.639** 0.652** 0.593** 0.531** 0.519** 0.453** 0.417** 0.375 *
  (0.158) (0.150) (0.147) (0.143) (0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) (0.145) (0.148) (0.148) (0.152) (0.153) (0.157) (0.159) 
 Regional export -0.253 * -0.278 * -0.354** -0.302 * -0.293 * -0.292 * -0.164  -0.059  -0.048   0.019  -0.082  -0.103  -0.056  -0.061  -0.056  -0.102  -0.125  
  (0.123) (0.124) (0.117) (0.134) (0.127) (0.126) (0.145) (0.157) (0.158) (0.153) (0.157) (0.157) (0.159) (0.170) (0.178) (0.182) (0.186) 
 Regional import -0.025   -0.034   0.020  0.000  -0.120  -0.096  -0.189  -0.201  -0.161   -0.112  -0.086  -0.021  -0.028  -0.073  -0.066  -0.067  -0.051  
  (0.130) (0.132) (0.128) (0.128) (0.125) (0.124) (0.125) (0.130) (0.132) (0.133) (0.131) (0.135) (0.132) (0.131) (0.134) (0.134) (0.135) 
MERCOSUR Intraregional 0.891 * 0.724 * 0.566  0.784  1.014** 0.936 * 1.054** 1.187** 1.210** 1.275** 1.056** 1.122** 0.843 * 0.801 * 0.880 * 0.800 * 0.831 *
  (0.347) (0.354) (0.354) (0.413) (0.384) (0.365) (0.352) (0.342) (0.344) (0.317) (0.375) (0.368) (0.393) (0.392) (0.359) (0.377) (0.384) 
 Regional export -0.989** -1.031** -1.169** -1.269** -1.334** -1.361** -1.618** -1.558** -1.519** -1.544** -1.433** -1.438** -1.149** -0.833** -0.869** -0.933** -0.999**
  (0.211) (0.202) (0.222) (0.248) (0.266) (0.258) (0.252) (0.242) (0.226) (0.190) (0.224) (0.232) (0.226) (0.206) (0.220) (0.216) (0.203) 
 Regional import -1.343** -1.379** -1.340** -1.326** -1.139** -1.109** -1.121** -1.050** -0.901** -0.734** -0.764** -0.893** -0.730** -0.747** -0.959** -0.941** -0.989**
  (0.199) (0.209) (0.234) (0.234) (0.212) (0.220) (0.218) (0.200) (0.200) (0.189) (0.220) (0.231) (0.238) (0.227) (0.222) (0.222) (0.214) 
ANDEAN Intraregional -0.267   -0.184   -0.037  0.091  0.380  0.448  0.679  0.592  0.668   0.912** 0.826 * 0.873 * 0.911** 0.806 * 0.855** 1.150** 0.499  
  (0.345) (0.361) (0.357) (0.375) (0.405) (0.397) (0.366) (0.418) (0.373) (0.329) (0.324) (0.371) (0.350) (0.343) (0.315) (0.288) (0.346) 
 Regional export -0.321   -0.189   -0.436  -0.677 * -0.736 * -0.848** -0.994** -0.778 * -0.829** -0.991** -0.871** -0.733 * -0.816** -0.836** -0.928** -1.332** -0.798**
  (0.291) (0.308) (0.301) (0.319) (0.341) (0.318) (0.307) (0.369) (0.317) (0.251) (0.271) (0.324) (0.280) (0.290) (0.265) (0.214) (0.286) 
 Regional import -0.610** -0.638** -0.630** -0.537 * -0.558** -0.729** -0.837** -0.799** -0.681** -0.501** -0.750** -0.796** -0.613** -0.694** -0.935** -0.936** -0.810**
  (0.194) (0.197) (0.227) (0.224) (0.194) (0.191) (0.180) (0.177) (0.172) (0.156) (0.171) (0.160) (0.142) (0.154) (0.167) (0.173) (0.168) 
CACM Intraregional 1.652** 1.702** 1.760** 1.971** 1.922** 1.851** 1.806** 1.806** 1.759** 2.084** 1.574** 1.853** 2.095** 1.805** 1.799** 1.897** 1.711**
  (0.401) (0.374) (0.422) (0.456) (0.410) (0.423) (0.385) (0.369) (0.394) (0.425) (0.425) (0.426) (0.428) (0.449) (0.463) (0.436) (0.415) 
 Regional export -1.113** -0.958** -1.085** -1.256** -1.313** -1.436** -1.400** -1.177** -0.993** -0.894** -0.889 * -1.125** -1.310** -1.371** -1.454** -1.574** -1.317**
  (0.311) (0.294) (0.340) (0.367) (0.344) (0.336) (0.289) (0.276) (0.313) (0.290) (0.356) (0.353) (0.356) (0.378) (0.383) (0.357) (0.334) 
 Regional import -0.518 * -0.445   -0.602 * -0.542  -0.468  -0.568 * -0.656 * -0.551 * -0.476   -0.223  -0.183  -0.234  -0.166  -0.150  -0.249  -0.365  -0.357  
  (0.225) (0.241) (0.262) (0.279) (0.270) (0.285) (0.256) (0.258) (0.250) (0.237) (0.238) (0.251) (0.245) (0.266) (0.274) (0.270) (0.268) 
ANZCERTA Intraregional 0.924** 0.968** 1.034** 1.114** 1.241** 1.267** 1.380** 1.411** 1.439** 1.405** 1.549** 1.348** 1.271** 1.201** 1.162** 1.079** 0.957**
  (0.320) (0.306) (0.308) (0.294) (0.294) (0.292) (0.286) (0.293) (0.288) (0.267) (0.289) (0.279) (0.282) (0.295) (0.288) (0.291) (0.311) 
 Regional export -1.165** -1.004 * -1.025** -1.123** -1.154** -1.138** -1.422** -1.381** -1.331** -1.386** -1.438** -1.193** -1.023** -1.230** -1.481** -1.550** -1.464**
  (0.410) (0.389) (0.394) (0.403) (0.429) (0.422) (0.407) (0.407) (0.391) (0.361) (0.374) (0.388) (0.380) (0.383) (0.374) (0.358) (0.372) 
 Regional import -0.576 * -0.652 * -0.874** -0.852** -0.712** -0.750** -0.879** -0.812** -0.724** -0.394  -0.416  -0.523  -0.444  -0.522 * -0.743** -0.836** -0.815**
 (0.289) (0.288) (0.292) (0.294) (0.260) (0.268) (0.257) (0.251) (0.261) (0.256) (0.261) (0.278) (0.265) (0.265) (0.268) (0.270) (0.273) 
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Table 16: Poisson Coefficients for Cross-Sectional Analysis (Counterfactual Variables)  
(Excluding Singapore-Indonesia Exports) 
 
Variable 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Ln(GDP of Exporter) 0.852** 0.85 ** 0.851** 0.842** 0.834** 0.823** 0.801** 0.802** 0.809** 0.813 ** 0.799** 0.804** 0.795** 0.798** 0.792** 0.788** 0.799**
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) 
Ln(GDP of Importer) 0.771** 0.773 ** 0.754** 0.745** 0.753** 0.749** 0.747** 0.76** 0.754** 0.758 ** 0.762** 0.778** 0.789** 0.784** 0.774** 0.764** 0.774**
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033) 
Ln(Distance) -0.734** -0.743 ** -0.739** -0.711** -0.694** -0.701** -0.662** -0.668** -0.665** -0.645 ** -0.664** -0.682** -0.691** -0.714** -0.73** -0.735** -0.745**
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) 
Contiguity 0.606** 0.585 ** 0.65** 0.642** 0.608** 0.618** 0.609** 0.605** 0.615** 0.632 ** 0.641** 0.668** 0.662** 0.678** 0.67** 0.697** 0.715**
 (0.148) (0.142) (0.152) (0.162) (0.167) (0.166) (0.157) (0.155) (0.160) (0.143) (0.141) (0.154) (0.153) (0.158) (0.165) (0.169) (0.176) 
Common Language 0.652** 0.682 ** 0.714** 0.761** 0.777** 0.763** 0.717** 0.674** 0.618** 0.55 ** 0.534** 0.513** 0.525** 0.577** 0.601** 0.583** 0.577**
 (0.144) (0.142) (0.146) (0.157) (0.149) (0.149) (0.153) (0.154) (0.150) (0.142) (0.143) (0.146) (0.144) (0.146) (0.153) (0.156) (0.157) 
Colony -0.215 * -0.222 * -0.289 * -0.279 * -0.256 * -0.263 * -0.232  -0.203  -0.184  -0.119   -0.108  -0.113  -0.146  -0.213  -0.275 * -0.294 * -0.32 *
 (0.109) (0.111) (0.116) (0.123) (0.122) (0.119) (0.122) (0.123) (0.122) (0.119) (0.116) (0.118) (0.116) (0.124) (0.128) (0.132) (0.133) 
Landlocked (Exporter) -0.384 * -0.427 * -0.518** -0.486 * -0.523** -0.575** -0.473** -0.417** -0.322 * -0.189   -0.221  -0.262  -0.251  -0.262  -0.284  -0.317  -0.331  
 (0.176) (0.178) (0.188) (0.202) (0.182) (0.185) (0.162) (0.161) (0.159) (0.147) (0.151) (0.158) (0.155) (0.161) (0.166) (0.168) (0.171) 
Landlocked (Importer) -0.107   -0.174   -0.193  -0.245  -0.334  -0.349  -0.406 * -0.357 * -0.317 * -0.198   -0.188  -0.165  -0.16  -0.235  -0.26  -0.286  -0.263  
 (0.183) (0.177) (0.184) (0.193) (0.195) (0.194) (0.159) (0.154) (0.154) (0.145) (0.143) (0.155) (0.152) (0.157) (0.163) (0.166) (0.171) 
Ln(Remoteness of Exporter) 1.466** 1.268 ** 1.36** 1.469** 1.483** 1.387** 1.8** 1.815** 1.745** 1.86 ** 1.802** 1.795** 1.637** 1.772** 1.85** 1.865** 1.865**
 (0.347) (0.313) (0.319) (0.362) (0.425) (0.429) (0.466) (0.486) (0.483) (0.411) (0.450) (0.499) (0.472) (0.471) (0.459) (0.443) (0.445) 
Ln(Remoteness of Importer) 1.109** 1.073 ** 1.258** 1.301** 1.101** 1.246** 1.304** 1.176** 1.09** 0.807 * 0.863 * 1.088** 0.983** 1.086** 1.235** 1.304** 1.278**
 (0.362) (0.335) (0.345) (0.343) (0.338) (0.356) (0.343) (0.343) (0.364) (0.345) (0.364) (0.410) (0.377) (0.362) (0.348) (0.340) (0.343) 
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Table 17:Poisson Coefficients for Cross-Sectional Analysis (RTA Dummies)  
(Excluding Singapore-Indonesia Exports) 
RTA Dummy 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
AFTA Intraregional -0.028   -0.175   -0.218  -0.242  -0.229  -0.138  -0.16  -0.183  -0.214  -0.065   -0.081  -0.139  -0.134  -0.158  -0.173  -0.185  -0.2  
  (0.319) (0.309) (0.299) (0.282) (0.282) (0.293) (0.287) (0.271) (0.253) (0.219) (0.236) (0.237) (0.231) (0.235) (0.238) (0.236) (0.239) 
 Regional export 0.213   0.308   0.283  0.207  0.215  0.242  0.119  0.135  0.197  0.422   0.37  0.361  0.362  0.232  0.145  0.081  0.114  
  (0.237) (0.229) (0.226) (0.239) (0.250) (0.245) (0.239) (0.241) (0.238) (0.222) (0.228) (0.238) (0.236) (0.238) (0.240) (0.234) (0.231) 
 Regional import 0.24   0.371   0.257  0.209  0.334  0.316  0.338  0.35  0.395 * 0.485 * 0.48 * 0.477 * 0.483 * 0.353  0.211  0.15  0.156  
  (0.232) (0.227) (0.230) (0.226) (0.204) (0.204) (0.191) (0.185) (0.191) (0.197) (0.200) (0.206) (0.200) (0.202) (0.204) (0.202) (0.205) 
NAFTA Intraregional -1.045 ** -0.945** -0.991** -0.774 * -0.618 * -0.536  -0.414  -0.337  -0.272  -0.126   -0.161  -0.208  -0.192  -0.259  -0.28  -0.283  -0.339  
  (0.294) (0.297) (0.297) (0.311) (0.295) (0.293) (0.304) (0.306) (0.299) (0.281) (0.282) (0.290) (0.284) (0.295) (0.317) (0.329) (0.332) 
 Regional export 0.075   0.001   -0.02  -0.05  -0.077  -0.109  0.077  0.179  0.186  0.22   0.174  0.15  0.144  0.052  -0.055  -0.15  -0.172  
  (0.151) (0.144) (0.137) (0.147) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.158) (0.175) (0.173) (0.179) (0.194) (0.200) (0.203) (0.196) (0.193) (0.200) 
 Regional import 0.588 ** 0.504** 0.503** 0.511** 0.454** 0.501** 0.428** 0.4** 0.45** 0.492** 0.554** 0.592** 0.516** 0.537** 0.478** 0.459** 0.46**
  (0.157) (0.149) (0.145) (0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.133) (0.137) (0.145) (0.149) (0.148) (0.160) (0.161) (0.158) (0.153) (0.151) (0.152) 
EU15 Intraregional 0.587 ** 0.537** 0.552** 0.595** 0.55** 0.548** 0.733** 0.696** 0.663** 0.639** 0.651** 0.592** 0.53** 0.518** 0.455** 0.419** 0.377 *
  (0.158) (0.150) (0.146) (0.143) (0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) (0.145) (0.148) (0.148) (0.151) (0.153) (0.157) (0.160) 
 Regional export -0.252 * -0.278 * -0.353** -0.301 * -0.292 * -0.29 * -0.162  -0.057  -0.047  0.02   -0.081  -0.101  -0.054  -0.059  -0.059  -0.105  -0.127  
  (0.123) (0.124) (0.117) (0.134) (0.127) (0.126) (0.145) (0.156) (0.157) (0.153) (0.157) (0.157) (0.159) (0.170) (0.178) (0.183) (0.186) 
 Regional import -0.024   -0.032   0.022  0.002  -0.118  -0.093  -0.184  -0.197  -0.157  -0.11   -0.083  -0.017  -0.025  -0.069  -0.073  -0.075  -0.058  
  (0.130) (0.132) (0.128) (0.128) (0.125) (0.124) (0.125) (0.130) (0.132) (0.133) (0.131) (0.135) (0.132) (0.131) (0.134) (0.134) (0.135) 
MERCOSUR Intraregional 0.893 * 0.725 * 0.568  0.785  1.016** 0.939 * 1.056** 1.19** 1.213** 1.277** 1.058** 1.126** 0.846 * 0.804 * 0.873 * 0.793 * 0.824 *
  (0.347) (0.354) (0.354) (0.413) (0.384) (0.365) (0.352) (0.342) (0.344) (0.318) (0.375) (0.369) (0.393) (0.392) (0.359) (0.377) (0.384) 
 Regional export -0.989 ** -1.031** -1.169** -1.269** -1.334** -1.361** -1.618** -1.558** -1.519** -1.544** -1.434** -1.438** -1.149** -0.833** -0.869** -0.933** -0.999**
  (0.211) (0.202) (0.222) (0.248) (0.266) (0.258) (0.252) (0.242) (0.226) (0.190) (0.224) (0.232) (0.226) (0.206) (0.220) (0.216) (0.203) 
 Regional import -1.344 ** -1.38** -1.34** -1.327** -1.141** -1.112** -1.125** -1.052** -0.904** -0.735** -0.766** -0.895** -0.731** -0.748** -0.957** -0.938** -0.987**
  (0.199) (0.209) (0.234) (0.234) (0.212) (0.220) (0.217) (0.200) (0.199) (0.189) (0.220) (0.231) (0.238) (0.227) (0.222) (0.222) (0.214) 
ANDEAN Intraregional -0.264   -0.181   -0.034  0.094  0.384  0.453  0.684  0.597  0.673  0.915** 0.83 * 0.878 * 0.916** 0.811 * 0.845** 1.14** 0.488  
  (0.345) (0.361) (0.357) (0.375) (0.405) (0.397) (0.366) (0.418) (0.373) (0.329) (0.324) (0.371) (0.350) (0.343) (0.315) (0.288) (0.347) 
 Regional export -0.321   -0.189   -0.437  -0.678 * -0.736 * -0.848** -0.995** -0.778 * -0.829** -0.991** -0.871** -0.734 * -0.817** -0.837** -0.927** -1.331** -0.797**
  (0.291) (0.308) (0.301) (0.319) (0.341) (0.318) (0.307) (0.369) (0.317) (0.251) (0.271) (0.324) (0.280) (0.290) (0.265) (0.214) (0.286) 
 Regional import -0.61 ** -0.638** -0.63** -0.537 * -0.557** -0.729** -0.838** -0.799** -0.681** -0.501** -0.749** -0.796** -0.613** -0.693** -0.937** -0.938** -0.812**
  (0.194) (0.197) (0.227) (0.224) (0.194) (0.191) (0.180) (0.177) (0.172) (0.156) (0.171) (0.160) (0.142) (0.154) (0.166) (0.173) (0.168) 
CACM Intraregional 1.653 ** 1.703** 1.761** 1.972** 1.923** 1.853** 1.808** 1.808** 1.761** 2.085** 1.576** 1.855** 2.097** 1.807** 1.796** 1.893** 1.707**
  (0.401) (0.374) (0.422) (0.455) (0.409) (0.423) (0.384) (0.368) (0.393) (0.425) (0.424) (0.426) (0.428) (0.448) (0.464) (0.437) (0.417) 
 Regional export -1.113 ** -0.959** -1.086** -1.256** -1.313** -1.436** -1.4** -1.177** -0.993** -0.893** -0.889 * -1.125** -1.309** -1.371** -1.454** -1.573** -1.317**
  (0.310) (0.294) (0.340) (0.366) (0.344) (0.336) (0.289) (0.276) (0.312) (0.290) (0.356) (0.352) (0.356) (0.377) (0.384) (0.358) (0.335) 
 Regional import -0.517 * -0.444   -0.601 * -0.541  -0.466  -0.567 * -0.654 * -0.549 * -0.473  -0.222   -0.181  -0.231  -0.163  -0.147  -0.255  -0.371  -0.364  
  (0.224) (0.241) (0.262) (0.279) (0.270) (0.285) (0.256) (0.258) (0.250) (0.237) (0.238) (0.251) (0.245) (0.266) (0.274) (0.271) (0.269) 
ANZCERTA Intraregional 0.923 ** 0.967** 1.032** 1.113** 1.239** 1.265** 1.377** 1.408** 1.436** 1.403** 1.547** 1.345** 1.269** 1.199** 1.166** 1.083** 0.96**
  (0.320) (0.306) (0.307) (0.294) (0.293) (0.292) (0.285) (0.292) (0.288) (0.267) (0.288) (0.279) (0.282) (0.295) (0.289) (0.291) (0.311) 
 Regional export -1.165 ** -1.004 * -1.024** -1.123** -1.154** -1.137** -1.422** -1.381** -1.33** -1.386** -1.437** -1.193** -1.023** -1.23** -1.482** -1.551** -1.465**
  (0.410) (0.389) (0.394) (0.403) (0.429) (0.422) (0.407) (0.407) (0.391) (0.361) (0.374) (0.388) (0.380) (0.382) (0.374) (0.359) (0.373) 
 Regional import -0.578 * -0.654 * -0.875** -0.853** -0.715** -0.754** -0.884** -0.816** -0.728** -0.396   -0.42  -0.527  -0.447  -0.526 * -0.736** -0.829** -0.807**
  (0.289) (0.288) (0.292) (0.294) (0.260) (0.268) (0.257) (0.251) (0.261) (0.256) (0.261) (0.278) (0.265) (0.265) (0.268) (0.269) (0.273) 
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Table 18: Poisson Coefficients for Panel Data Analysis 
(Excluding Singapore-Indonesia Exports) 
RTA Dummy Coef.  Std. Err. 
AFTA  Intraregional -0.015  (0.132)
 Regional exports 0.092  (0.070)
 Regional imports -0.024  (0.050)
   
NAFTA Intraregional 0.499** (0.121)
 Regional exports -0.175** (0.027)
 Regional imports -0.045  (0.060)
   
EU15 Intraregional -0.008  (0.039)
 Regional exports 0.098** (0.035)
 Regional imports 0.072  (0.044)
   
MERCOSUR Intraregional 0.190  (0.233)
 Regional exports -0.111* (0.050)
 Regional imports 0.493** (0.050)
   
ANDEAN Intraregional 0.834** (0.157)
 Regional exports -0.431** (0.070)
 Regional imports -0.040  (0.050)
   
CACM Intraregional 0.030  (0.247)
 Regional exports 0.067  (0.104)
 Regional imports 0.244* (0.106)
   
ANZCERTA Intraregional 0.399** (0.119)
 Regional exports -0.090  (0.059)
 Regional imports -0.165** (0.059)
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Table 19: Poisson Coefficients for Panel Data Analysis Recent RTAs 
 (Excluding Singapore-Indonesia exports) 
RTA Dummy Coef.  Std. Err.
ACFTA Intraregional -0.216 * (0.095)
 Regional exports 0.336 ** (0.052)
 Regional imports 0.246 ** (0.059)
    
Japan-S’pore Intraregional -0.083   (0.092)
 Regional exports -0.047   (0.057)
 Regional imports -0.019   (0.042)
    
New Zealand-S’pore Intraregional 0.198   (0.166)
 Regional exports -0.058   (0.059)
 Regional imports -0.068 * (0.034)
    
S’pore Australia Intraregional 0.078   (0.238)
 Regional exports -0.082   (0.057)
 Regional imports -0.136 ** (0.040)
    
US-S’pore Intraregional -0.116   (0.112)
 Regional exports -0.088   (0.062)
 Regional imports -0.013   (0.048)
    
  0.011   (0.046)
EU15 to EU25 expansion Intraregional 0.253 ** (0.041)
 Regional exports 0.019   (0.045)
 Regional imports   
  -0.115 ** (0.033)
EC-Mexico Intraregional 0.063 ** (0.016)
 Regional exports 0.087 ** (0.023)
 Regional imports   
  0.223   (0.123)
US-Chile Intraregional -0.121   (0.066)
 Regional exports -0.014   (0.055)
 Regional imports   
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Table 20: List of Sample Countries for Analysis of New RTAs 
 
 
 
 
Code Country Code Country Code Country Code Country 
ALB Albania EST Estonia MYS Malaysia SVN Slovenia 
ARG Argentina FIN Finland MDV Maldives ZAF South Africa 
AUS Australia FRA France MLT Malta ESP Spain 
AUT Austria GMB Gambia, The MUS Mauritius LCA St. Lucia 
AZE Azerbaijan GEO Georgia MEX Mexico VCT St. Vincent and the Grenadines
BRB Barbados DEU Germany MDA Moldova SDN Sudan 
BLZ Belize GHA Ghana MNG Mongolia SWE Sweden 
BEN Benin GRC Greece MAR Morocco CHE Switzerland 
BOL Bolivia GTM Guatemala NLD Netherlands TWN Taiwan 
BRA Brazil HND Honduras NZL New Zealand TZA Tanzania 
BGR Bulgaria HKG Hong Kong, ChinaNIC Nicaragua THA Thailand 
BDI Burundi HUN Hungary NER Niger TGO Togo 
CAN Canada ISL Iceland NOR Norway TTO Trinidad and Tobago 
CPV Cape Verde IND India PAK Pakistan TUN Tunisia 
CHL Chile IDN Indonesia PAN Panama TUR Turkey 
CHN China IRL Ireland PRY Paraguay UGA Uganda 
COL Colombia ISR Israel PER Peru UKR Ukraine 
CRI Costa Rica ITA Italy PHL Philippines GBR United Kingdom 
CIV Cote d'Ivoire JPN Japan POL Poland USA United States 
HRV Croatia KAZ Kazakhstan PRT Portugal URY Uruguay 
CYP Cyprus KOR Korea, Rep. ROM Romania VEN Venezuela, RB 
CZE Czech Republic LVA Latvia RUS Russian FederationYEM Yemen, Rep. 
DNK Denmark LTU Lithuania SEN Senegal ZMB Zambia 
ECU Ecuador MKD Macedonia, FYR SGP Singapore     
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. MWI Malawi SVK Slovak Republic     
  
